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Abstract
Low hour, inexperienced General Aviation (GA) pilots account for the majority of
weather-related incidents, which often result in fatalities. Previous research identifies poor
preflight planning practices and a lack of aviation weather knowledge as key contributing factors
to the high novice private pilot accident and fatality rate. Research invested into resolving these
issues often attempt to introduce new inflight weather technology to assist pilots with weather
avoidance. However, these interventions usually result in pilots using the information to
strategically navigate closer to degraded weather conditions (Beringer & Ball, 2004; Burgess &
Thomas, 2004). Therefore, the purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of a
performance support tool for weather preflight (PWDST) on pilots’ preflight performance and
inflight performance. Seventy-eight private pilots (Mage = 20.15, SD = 2.56) without instrument
ratings were recruited from a Southeastern US university. Forty-one visual flight rule (VFR)
private pilots were randomly assigned to the control group (no preflight decision tool) and 37
VFR private pilots were assigned to the experimental group (preflight decision tool). Participants
performed a weather preflight and a simulated flight for one VFR into instrument meteorological
conditions scenario (i.e., VFR to IMC). Results indicated that participants in the PWDST
condition examined significantly more weather products and reported higher weather awareness
following the preflight activities than did participants in the control group. Furthermore, results
also indicated that participants in the PWDST condition spent significantly less time in IMC than
participants in the control condition. Additionally, results revealed that preflight decision-making
was predicted by preflight performance and inflight decision-making was predicted by pilots’
awareness of weather inflight.
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Findings from this study suggest that preflight weather performance support tools may
be able to assist low hour inexperienced with preflight and inflight performance.
Keywords: Aviation Weather, Performance Support Tools, Automation, Flight decision-making
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AVIATION WEATHER PREFLIGHT DECISION SUPPORT TOOL
TO IMPROVE GA PILOTS PREFLIGHT AND INFLIGHT PERFORMANCE
General Aviation (GA) incurs the majority of weather-related accidents within civil aviation
operations. GA weather-related accidents have a very high fatality rate – a rate has been slowly
decreasing over the last 30 years. Further investigation into the accident data reveals, VFR into
IMC accidents account for the majority of weather-related fatalities. Previous research also
indicates private pilots with low experience and pilots without their instrument rating were the
most likely to fly VFR into IMC. Moreover, pilots who fly VFR into IMC tend to have
overconfidence in their abilities and a lack of weather knowledge. As a result, research efforts
have been invested into solving the general aviation problem, and new technology, training, and
understanding has been gathered and assimilated into GA operations. However, the “General
Aviation problem”, specifically VFR into IMC, still persists.
Underlying the stagnant GA aviation accident rate may be that pilots have limited
understanding of weather products and theory which, in turn, may result in pilots having only
rudimentary mental maps of inflight weather. Consequently, a lack of weather situational
awareness and inadequate risk assessment may lead to poor decision-making and error.
However, if pilots were provided a performance support tool to aid them in the preflight process
for weather, pilots’ understanding of weather, weather-related decisions, and inflight weatherrelated behavior may improve. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of a
performance support tool for weather preflight on pilots’ preflight performance and inflight
performance.
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL AVIATION WEATHER PROBLEM
Over the last 20 years, General Aviation (GA) accidents have accounted for the majority of
civil aviation weather-related accidents. Additionally, GA weather accidents have included
alarmingly high fatality rates (see figure 1). This issue has been a subject of concern for both the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
The most dangerous of all GA weather-related accidents are VFR into IMC incidents. Research
suggests VFR into IMC occur more frequently amongst low certificate and low hour pilots. This
next section will review the GA accident rate and research on possible contributing factors.
GA Weather Accident Rate
The Federal Aviation Administration completed a detailed review of the General Aviation
(GA) Weather-related accidents that occurred between 2003 and 2007 (FAA, 2010). The results
indicated that general aviation (GA) operations incur the majority of weather-related accidents
compared to Part 135 and 121 operations (FAA, 2010). In fact, between 2003 and 2007, 88% of
weather-related accidents were defined as GA Operations. Research has also indicated that most
weather-related accidents occurred during the day and while performing GA personal operations
(FAA, 2010; Fultz & Ashley, 2016; Nall, 2008). Personal Part 91 flight operations accounted for
1,105 of the cumulative 1,532 GA weather-related accidents between 2003 and 2007 (FAA,
2010). In 2007, 39.4% of GA operations were personal flights. However, GA personal flights
accounted for 69.1% of GA accidents and 72.9% of GA fatal accidents (Nall, 2008). Additional
study results reported that, between 2003 and 2007, 733 Part 91 weather-related accidents
resulted in fatalities (FAA, 2010). However, the data indicates the weather-related accident

13

fatality rate has decreased, from 95 accidents resulting in fatalities in 2003, to 36 weather-related
accidents in 2007 (FAA, 2010). Despite the decreasing fatality rate amongst GA weather-related
accidents, the severe injury rate has remained stagnant at an average 32.2 % yearly rate (FAA,
2010).
Fultz & Ashley (2016) conducted a review of fatal GA weather accidents by analyzing
accidents that occurred between 1982 and 2013. Research revealed between 1982 and 2013, 25%
of 58,687 GA accidents identified weather as a primary contributing factor (Fultz & Ashley,
2016). Fortunately, GA weather-related accidents are on a declining trend (FAA, 2010; Fultz &
Ashley, 2016; Nall, 2008). In particular, between 1982 and 2013, GA accidents have decreased
by 50%, when considering GA accident subcategories, weather-related accidents have declined
by 70% (Fultz & Ashley, 2016). However the GA weather-related fatal accidents rate is
decreasing at much slower rate than the overall decrease in GA weather-related accidents (Fultz
& Ashley, 2016).

Figure 1. Part 91 Weather-related Accidents by Injury Severity. This graph depicts Injury Severity of General Aviation Weatherrelated Accidents between 2003 and 2007.
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Weather Contributing Factors
Certain hazardous weather phenomena can potentially have a severe, negative impact on
flight performance. These include wind, visibility/ceiling, high density altitude, carburetor icing,
updraft/downdraft, precipitation, turbulence, structural icing, wind shear, thunderstorm, thermal
lift, temperature extremes, and lightning (FAA, 2010). Wind, visibility/ceiling, and high density
altitude constitute the top three weather conditions with the most weather-related citations, with
wind identified as the most prominent weather contributing factor, with 1,047 weather-related
citations (FAA, 2010). In particular, crosswinds, gusts, and tail winds were highlighted as wind
phenomena with the most citations (FAA, 2010; Fultz & Ashley, 2016). However, although wind
is the most cited condition with 40% wind-related GA accidents, wind resulted in only 13% of
GA fatal weather accidents. Capobianco and Lee (2001) claim wind related accidents’ low
fatality rate may be a consequence of wind usually affecting flight performance during takeoff
and landing procedures (Capobianco & Lee, 2001; Fultz & Ashley, 2016).
In agreement with FAA (2010), Fultz & Ashley (2016) also found temperature, humidity,
and pressure as weather phenomena contributing factors. These weather conditions were cited as
causal factors for 20% of weather-related accidents and 23% of those accidents resulted in
fatalities (Fultz & Ashley, 2016). In particular, carburetor icing and high density altitude were
the most cited of the temperature, humidity, and pressure weather condition factors. High density
altitude was associated with 42% of weather-related accidents, whereas, Carburetor icing
contributed to 34% (Fultz & Ashley, 2016). However, while these subcategories attributed to a
remarkable proportion of temperature, humidity, and pressure weather-related accidents, again,
fatality rates were relatively low. During the 30-year analysis, carburetor icing was identified as
a contributing factor for only 79 fatal weather-related accidents and high density contributing
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factor altitude (changes in altitude/pressure, temperature, and humidity that effect engine and
aerodynamic performance of the aircraft) for 297 out of 1,268 high density altitude questions
(Fultz & Ashley, 2016). Within this category of temperature, humidity, and pressure weather
condition factors, structural icing attributed to 50% of weather-related accidents and only 8% of
fatal accidents across all categories (Fultz & Ashley, 2016).
Another area of review has been turbulence and convective weather. Fultz & Ashley (2016)
cited turbulence and convective weather as a contributing factor for 8% of all weather-related
accidents in their period of review. Despite the overall low contributing factor rate, Turbulence
and convective weather condition factors have a high fatality rate. In fact, 65% of all the
turbulence and convective weather-related accidents resulted in at least one fatality. General
turbulence and thunderstorms were associated with the majority of turbulence and convective
fatal accidents (Fultz & Ashley, 2016). Capobianco & Lee (2001) theorized the reasoning for the
low turbulence and thunderstorm accident rate and high fatality rate may be a result of pilots’
awareness of the negative impact these conditions have on flight performance. Therefore, pilots
may tend to avoid thunderstorms (Capobianco & Lee, 2001) but, when these hazards are
encountered, these flights often end in fatalities.
Ceiling, visibility, and precipitation is another area of concern. This weather condition
category is associated with 27% of weather-related accidents and are affiliated with 71% GA
weather-related fatalities (Fultz & Ashley, 2016). Low ceilings/cloud layers and fog were the
most cited weather phenomena within the ceiling, visibility, and precipitation contributing
factors category. Specifically, low ceilings/cloud layers accounted for 57% of ceiling, visibility,
and precipitation weather-related fatal accidents, while, fog contributed to 40% of ceiling,
visibility, and precipitation weather-related accidents and fatal accidents.
16

Weather conditions associated with the ceiling, visibility, and precipitation condition
category are weather phenomena that largely constitute instrument meteorological conditions
(IMC). The FAA General Operating Flight rules (FAA 14 CFR) define IMC as weather
conditions below the weather minimums required for flight within visual flight rules. The CFR
requires pilots to fly in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) when flying in IMC. The
majority of weather-related accidents described in this ceiling, visibility, and precipitation
weather condition category were Visual Flight Rules flight operations in IMC. Capobianco &
Lee (2001) also claim that VFR into IMC was often associated with pilot error, pilots flying
close to VFR minimums and becoming immersed in IMC.
It is also interesting to consider how weather accident rates have changed over time.
Although some reports indicate decreases in weather accidents, others show increases or nochange. This is particularly true regarding fatal accidents. Overall, results indicate the proportion
of wind related accidents have increased from 44% of all GA weather-related accidents in 1982
to 60% in 2013 (Fultz & Ashley, 2016). In contrast, turbulence related accidents have shown
small decreases in accident rate during the study time period. Similarly, ceiling, visibility, and
precipitation GA weather-related accidents have decreased from 30% to 15% over the course of
the observed time period (Fultz & Ashley, 2016). However, despite the improvement with a
decrease in percentage of ceiling, visibility, and precipitation related accidents, this weather
condition category still accounted for 60% of GA weather-related fatalities during the study
period. In fact, Fultz & Ashley (2016) argue that the decrease in GA weather-related accidents
may be due to a general decrease in GA operations as a whole, rather than, improved pilot
understanding of weather and hazardous weather.
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VFR to IMC
Thus, VFR into IMC is markedly one of the most dangerous of all GA weather-related
accidents (Capobianco & Lee, 2001; Fultz & Ashley, 2016). As a result, research has been aimed
toward determining the primary contributing factors for GA weather-related accidents,
specifically, VFR into IMC (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001). Previous research suggests inadequate
preflight planning, poor decision-making, poor situational awareness, inadequate risk
assessment, and technology may play a key role in pilots flying VFR unintentionally into IMC
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2005). Because of the danger inherent to VFR to IMC,
the current research will focus on that weather phenomenon.
Pilot Qualifications
Research has shown that private pilots have incurred the majority of fatal accidents (Nall,
2008). Specifically, 773 GA weather-related accidents that occurred between 2003 and 2007
featured Private Pilot as the Pilot in Command (PIC), while 460 PIC held a Commercial
certificate, and 179 held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate (ATP) (FAA, 2010). Goh &
Wiegmann (2001) conducted a specific analysis on VFR into IMC accidents from 1990 until
1997. Their results were similar to the results found in Fultz & Ashley (2016), the majority of
pilots who encountered adverse weather inadvertently held a pilot certificate or less without an
instrument rating. Additionally, Goh & Wiegmann (2001) found that the majority of the VFR
into IMC accidents were encountered inadvertently. They suggest these pilots may be less
experienced interpreting weather, resulting in poor situation evaluation and poor decisionmaking.
In summary, non-fatal GA weather-related accident rate seems to be declining. However, the
GA weather-related fatal accident rate is slowly decreasing (Capobianco & Lee, 2001; FAA,
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2010; Fultz & Ashley, 2016; Nall, 2019; Wiegmann et al., 2005). Further investigation has
highlighted VFR into IMC, specifically ceiling and visibility, as one of the most dangerous and
frequently occurring GA weather-related fatal accidents. (Capobianco & Lee, 2001; Fultz &
Ashley, 2016). The pilots who encounter a VFR to IMC situation are usually Private pilots
without instrument certification.
To comprehensively address the issue of VFR into IMC accidents, it is imperative for
researchers to thoroughly understand the causal factors behind VFR into IMC accidents. The
next section will first describe weather sources and products available for pilots to use to avoid
VFR into IMC.
Weather Sources and Products
Weather sources can have a prominent effect on a pilots’ preflight planning and inflight
abilities (Parson et al., 2005). Therefore, it is important for pilots to select proper weather
sources. There are three primary FAA approved sources for preflight weather information:
Aviation Weather Center, and Leidos 1-800wxbrief. These sources offer a variety of weather
products used to report weather phenomena. As shown in Table 1, there are three categories of
weather products, Analysis, Forecasts, and Observations (FAA, 2016).
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Table 1.
Weather Products Descriptions
Category

Product Name

Observation

Description

Inflight

Graphical
and Textual

This product reports current
weather at an airport at the time of
observation , including: Wind,
Visibility, Runway Visual Range
(RVR), Present Weather
Phenomena, Sky Conditions,
Temperature, Dewpoint, and
Altimeter Setting.

Yes

Graphical
and Textual

This product is a self reporting
summary of weather phenomena
in an area.

Yes

Graphical

This product reports insentity of
precipitation occuring in a certain
area.

Yes

Graphical

Satellite products report
temperature and sunlight reflected
from the earth's surface and
clouds. With this information,
pilots can infer cloud position and
height.

No

Surface Analysis

Graphical

This weather product reports
pressure systems and front types.

No

Ceiling and Visibility
Analysis

Graphical

This weather product Reports realtime weather conditions such as,
Flight Category, Ceiling, and
Visbilitiy.

Yes

Sigmet (convective
and non
convectice)

Graphical

This weather product reports
Severe Turbulence, Icing,
Widespread Thunderstoms,
Duststorms, Sand Storms, and
Volcanic Ash.

No

Graphical Airmet

Graphical
and Textual

Metar

Pilot Weather
Report

Radar

Satellite

This product reports forecasted
weather conditions, including: IFR,
Ceiling, Visbility, Icing, Freezing
Level, and Turbulence at specific
times.

No

Terminal Area
Forceast

Textual

This product is a concise forecast
of weather wihtin 5 staute miles of
airport for a specific time.

No

Winds Aloft

Textual

This product provides a forecast of
temperature, wind direction, and
speed at certain times.

No

Forecast

Analysis

Presentation

Freezing Level
Chart

Reports lowest freezing level
heights

Graphical

This product provides a forecast of
precipitation, presure systems,
and fronts.

No

Surface Prognostic
chart

Graphical

Low level
Significant Weather
Chart

Graphical

This product reports flight
categories, freezing levels, and
turbulence.

No

Graphical

This forecast reports icing
location, severity, and probability.

No

CIP/FIP
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No

First, analysis products are augmented representations of observed weather information or
presentation of an atmospheric phenomena (temperature and ceiling height). Most analyses
present automated information (FAA, 2016), which is information that has been gathered and
synthesized using automation with no human meteorologist personnel involved in the process.
The surface analysis chart and the Ceiling and Visibility Analysis (CVA) are two analysis
products (see Table 1). The surface analysis is a graphical product that displays fronts and
surface pressure information, while CVA is a graphical product that reports ceiling and visibility
information as well as flight categories. Analysis products are crucial for preflight weather
planning; they provide the user with current regional and national weather conditions. This
information helps pilots understand current weather conditions.
Observation products present raw information obtained from weather sensors, examples of
observation information include, METAR and Radar. METAR reports weather information at a
specific airport and Radar reports precipitation activity (FAA, 2016). Both Observation and
analysis products are crucial for preflight weather planning; they provide the user with current
specific, regional, and national weather conditions (see Table 1).
Forecasts are predictions of how weather phenomena will develop. Examples include
Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAF) and significant meteorological information (SIGMET)
charts. TAFs provide a summary of forecasted weather conditions for a specific area (FAA,
2016). SIGMETs are graphical products that provide forecasted hazardous weather information
(FAA, 2016). Forecasted products help pilots perceive weather trends and plan for developing
weather conditions along their route (see Table 1).
However, even with all of the weather products available, pilots are still having difficulty
with preflight and inflight weather avoidance (Fultz & Ashley, 2016). This could be due to the
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cognitive complexities associated with understanding aviation weather and performing preflight
and inflight cognitive tasks. However, before describing the preflight and inflight tasks, it is
important to review the human information processing model.
Human Information Processing
Cognitive Tasks are assessed through investigating how operators process information and
select and execute actions. As shown in Figure 2, one of the most researched models for
understanding human cognitive process is the Human Information Processing Model (Wickens,
Gordon, Liu, & Lee, 1998).

Figure 2. Human Information Processing Model

The human information processing model is organized into three main components, encoding
sensory information, central processing of information, and response selection. During the
encoding sensory stage, stimuli input is sensed by the operator through visual, auditory, haptic, or
olfactory sensor receptors (see Figure 2). Once the information is registered, the information is
perceived, in other words, the received raw sensation is given meaning. For example, when pilots
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receive taxi instructions from ATC, this information is sensed by the operators’ ears as sound
waves and then perceived by the brain as taxi instructions.
Then this information is stored in the person’s short term memory. Usually, unless rehearsed,
short term memory can only hold seven to nine chunks of information before information is lost.
However, if this information is processed and stored in long term memory the information will
be accessible much longer and the total long term memory capacity is vast. The brain uses
information stored in short/working memory and long term memory to select and execute
responses. For example, in the case of the previous ATC taxi scenario, once the taxi instructions
are stored in working memory, the brain recalls information from long term memory such as a
mental model of the airport diagram and taxiways. The recalled information assists pilots when
executing directions and deciding whether to turn right or left. Then, once the decision is made,
the operator relies on information from long term memory on piloting and taxi skills to help
execute the action. Using the information processing model, researchers can complete a task
analysis and identify possible limitations, and hazards for users and in turn, develop solutions.
This next section reviews the weather preflight planning process to identify components that
may cause limitations and errors.
Preflight Planning
Preflight weather planning is crucial to safe GA operations. Although pilots access weather
while in-flight, most of weather product interpretation and planning occurs during the preflight
phase. During preflight planning, pilots use aviation weather knowledge and skills to interpret
weather information concerning their flight route. The FAA divides the preflight weather
planning process into three main components: Perceive, Process, Perform (Parson et al., 2005).
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Beginning with the “perceiving” phase, pilots are gathering information to conceptualize
meteorological conditions along their route (Parson et al., 2005). Information acquisition is a
crucial component of the preflight process. If incomplete or in error, pilots may not receive vital
information (see Table 2). When completing the preflight process, pilots first identify their route
and landmarks on their aeronautical sectional chart (Parson et al., 2005). Next, pilots review the
weather along their route by accessing various weather products (Parson et al., 2005). This is
described as the information acquisition step. However, there are numerous factors that can
hinder this process.
When gathering information, it is imperative pilots select the appropriate weather sources.
Although there are various weather sources available for pilots, pilots should consider the
various weather source vendors (e.g. Aviation Weather Center (AWC), 1-800 Weather Brief),
how the information is produced (Lanicci et al., 2012), and limiting factors (Blickensderfer et al.,
2015). All these factors such can dramatically impact the quality of weather information
provided and stored in the working memory.
In the gathering information and perceiving stage, a number of challenges may arise.
First, pilots may have difficulty accessing certain products due to the usability of the weather
source (Latorella & Chamberlain, 2002; Defilippis et al., 2018).
Table 2.
Preflight Task Analysis

Perceive

Steps

Tasks

Decide which
product to access

Tools

N/A

Knowledge
Knowledge of
product report
information
Knowledge of
product
limitations
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Skills

Limitations
Failure to access
essential products

N/A

Failure to select correct
weather products for
retrieving information on
various weather
phenomena

Knowledge of
product issuance
times

Find desired
product

Weather
sources: AWC,
Duats, 18000
wx brief,
Foreflight

Knowledge of
product
limitations

Ability to
navigate the
AWC website

Knowledge of
product issuance
times

Failure to collect all
appropriate products by
excluding region
information
Failure to collect time
valid products
Failure to collect correct
weather information

Knowledge of
interpretation
criteria specific to
each product

Process

Knowledge of
how to interpret
each product
Interpret the
accessed product

The accessed
weather product

Knowledge of
product legend

N/A

Failure to accurately
interpret product
information

Ability to apply
weather
information

Failure to consider
weather information
when making flight
planning decisions

Perform

Knowledge of
aviation weather
principles related
to reported
weather
phenomena
Knowledge of
Product
limitations

Apply
information to
aeronautical
preflight
planning

Departure and
destination
airports
Aeronautical
and weather
information

Knowledge of
how weather
affects aircraft
performance and
flight category
conditions

For example, if a pilot wants to access infrared satellite images using AWC, the pilot may not
be able to find the weather product due to poor website design. On the AWC website, to access
the satellite products, pilots have to discern whether satellite images are categorized as a forecast,
observation, or an advisory product. After selecting the satellite image type option, users then
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need to know which geographical region they need a report for and which type of satellite image
would provide them with the information needed. This process can be very cognitively taxing
and complicated for a novice pilot to navigate on their own, pilots may not be able to recall this
information easily from their long term memory (see Table 2).
Additionally, pilots may be unfamiliar with product limitations and may access inappropriate
products for information regarding certain weather phenomena (Lanicci et al., 2012). For
example, if a pilot wants to evaluate cloud coverage along their flight route, and they access
radar believing they will receive information on cloud location and movement, the information
they receive would be misleading. For example, radar only reports precipitation, not cloud
information. Also, since the product is new to the user, the pilot will have to rely more on their
working memory.
Another challenge is simply remembering to access all applicable weather products that
would inform them of the conditions for their flight. Checking multiple products is necessary to
get a robust understanding of the weather (Vincent et al., 2013). Depending on the weather
source accessed, while the weather products are available, no guide exists for the pilots
prompting them on what products to examine for their preflight plan. For less experienced pilots,
this may result in incomplete review of products as pilots may simply forget to access certain
weather products with valuable information. This could be a result of too much information
being stored in the working memory, which can lead to mistakes and erroneous performance.
After accessing the weather products/information, pilots need to analyze the information
received, this is referred to as the “process stage” (Parson et al., 2005). During this stage,
aviation weather principles are used to interpret weather products (e.g. Table 2). Again, product
usability can serve as a barrier between pilots and needed weather information (Latorella &
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Chamberlain, 2002). For instance, certain weather products do not feature legends or their
legends do not feature all the symbols present on the weather product (e.g. Aviation Forecast).
With the multitude of weather products available, it is unlikely that pilots have what each symbol
and abbreviation represents for every weather product in their long term memory. Additionally,
some weather products may display a legend; however, the legend itself may be unclear
regarding the weather phenomena being reported in the product. For example, consider infrared
satellite imagery, the legend presents the various colors used in the product and informs the user
the different colors are associated with different temperatures (FAA, 2016). However, the
product does not show any information informing the user that the light colors and cooler
temperature are used to imply higher altitude clouds, whereas the darker colors imply lower
altitudes. The legend assumes that the user (in this case pilots) possess a high level of knowledge
of these concepts. Unfortunately, assumptions such as this can make product interpretation a
challenging task for novice pilots.
The next step in the preflight planning process, “Perform” requires pilots to make decisions
based on their evaluation of the weather reports (Parson et al., 2005). However, a lack of
capability to interpret weather products combined with a lack aviation weather knowledge could
limit the effectiveness of pilots’ weather-related decision-making (Blickensderfer et al., 2015). It
is possible that, due to a poor knowledge of aviation weather principles, pilots may be incapable
of linking weather reports to certain weather phenomena. For example, the Surface analysis chart
displays a legend clearly decoding all the symbols used on the product. However, If the user does
not understand what weather phenomena is associated with high and low pressures, cold/ war
fronts, isobars, the product is rendered useless. This is concerning considering that pilots use
weather information to decide what aspects of their flight route need alteration due to weather
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conditions. Pilots need a grounded understanding of aviation weather fundamentals in their long
term memory to understand the weather phenomena being reported and how it will affect their
inflight performance. For instance, if weather products report low ceiling and poor visibility,
pilots then would have to predict how that weather will develop and when and how it will affect
their flight path. Applying weather information to flight operations is crucial for deciding
alternate airports and diversion plans in case of emergencies. However, planning for future
events can be difficult if pilots have limited aviation weather knowledge. In other words, even if
weather products have high degrees of usability (e.g., legends clearly identifying the various
symbols and abbreviations etc.), pilots may still have difficulty applying these products due to a
lack of understanding of how weather phenomena impact in-flight performance. Without a solid
foundation of basic weather principles in the long term memory, and weather condition
information gathered in the working memory, users may have limited experience and knowledge
to recall to assist with the current challenges of applying gained knowledge from the preflight
process to the context of their flight route.
Preflight preparation is crucial to safe flight activity (Parson et al., 2005). However, each
step of the preflight process requires pilots to have knowledge of aviation products and weather
knowledge. Without an adequate understanding, pilots will be unable to acquire, interpret, and
apply weather information. In turn, this could lead to a poorly developed mental model of
weather conditions while in flight, which, in turn can have significant negative effects on pilot
inflight decisions. While inflight, pilots should refer to preflight weather notes and monitor
developing weather by contacting inflight weather sources such as HIWAS, and ASOS.
However, without a firm understanding of how weather affects flight performance (long term
memory) and a weather plan (working memory), pilots may not be equipped to mitigate
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hazardous event while in flight (Lanicci et al., 2012). Therefore, it is imperative to understand
and mitigate poor aviation knowledge and skills and to understand products and limitations.
Decision Making
Decision-making skills and judgment assessments are essential for weather avoidance and
hazardous weather encounter recovery (FAA, 2017). However, humans suffer from various
cognitive biases that may hinder logical decision-making (NTSB, 2005). As a result, decisionmaking errors are prevalent and may be exacerbated depending on information available,
environmental factors, and physiological factors (NTSB, 2005).
For example, “pilot continuation” is a decision error where pilots continue flight activity
into degrading weather conditions, seemingly ignoring the evidence indicating unsafe flight
conditions (NTSB, 2005). This can occur during a VFR into IMC incident, as pilots experience
IMC and fail to divert to an alternate airport, change flight route, or return toward a departure
airport (NTSB, 2005). It may appear that pilots who find themselves in “VFR into IMC”
situations have high risk tolerance, when in actuality there are a variety of factors impacting a
pilot’s decision to continue into degrading weather (NTSB, 2005). For instance, it is possible that
some pilots continue into IMC due to an inadequate assessment of the current weather situation.
Therefore, pilots’ poor judgement may not be a direct effect of the propensity for risk taking;
instead, it may be rooted in a misunderstanding of weather and its effects on flight.
“Prospect theory” describes another cognitive bias that can affect weather-related decisionmaking. Prospect theory explains how framing courses of action as either a “gain” or “loss” can
have an effect on participant decision selection (Kahneman & Tversky, 1986). Goh & Wiegmann
(2001) explained how prospect theory can affect weather-related decision-making in VFR into
IMC incidents. They argued that many pilots associate diverting from their flight route due to
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hazardous weather as a loss and that, in turn, this may encourage pilots to continue flight into
degrading weather (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001). In contrast, if pilots frame diverting as a gain (i.e.,
the gain being that they will remain safe and without injury), then pilots may be more likely to
divert when facing IMC (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001). O’Hare & Smitheram (1995) also
investigated the decision framing effects on decision-making during VFR into IMC accidents.
Results indicated that pilots who framed VFR into IMC operations as losses and safe diverting as
gains, were less likely to continue flight into degrading weather.
Experience and Aviation Weather Skill Acquisition. While decision-making biases may be a
contributing factor for VFR into IMC, decision errors may also stem from poor aviation weather
knowledge or skill. As aforementioned, most weather accidents occur with less experienced
private pilots (FAA, 2010; Fultz & Ashley, 2006). GA weather-related accident data identified
low experience, non-instrument rated pilots as the major demographic for VFR into IMC
operations (National Transportation Safety Board, 2005) and that operational weather experience
is related to weather decision-making abilities and skill acquisition (National Transportation
Safety Board, 2005).
Research in skill acquisition and cognitive psychology describes the skill acquisition
process as novice operators progress to intermediate and expert proficiency levels (Anderson,
1993; Patel & Groen, 1991: Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995). Research demonstrates that skill
acquisition is built through the collection of multiple experiences and cases stored in long term
memory (Anderson, 1993). These cases and examples are then recalled and acclimated to assist
with the challenge at hand (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). Operators/pilots at varying levels of
expertise and skill acquisition (novices, intermediate, or experts) operate differently. Novices
will often function less precisely and skillfully than intermediates, and intermediates less than

30

experts (Wiggins, Stevens, Howard, Henley, & O’Hare, 2002). Novices’ poor performance is
due to the undeveloped knowledge and skills required to complete tasks comprehensively (Patel
& Groen, 1991: Wiggins & O'Hare, 1995). Prior research suggests that, as task difficulty
increases, the difference between expert and novice information acquisition methods will widen
(Woods, 1988). Thus, these differences in skill acquisition may be more prevalent in aviation
and preflight planning, due to the task difficulty, high stake risks, and ambiguous weather-related
information. It is likely that differences in weather-related knowledge and skills is one reason the
private pilots are getting into trouble. Interestingly, however, when investigating differences in
pilot expertise, research suggests that intermediate pilots may be more at risk for unsafe flight
activity (Wiggins, Stevens, Howard, Henley, & O’Hare, 2002). Intermediate pilots are in a
particular position in which they may be more prone to decision-making errors (O’Hare,
Wiggins, Batts, Morrison, 1994). Unlike novice pilots, intermediate pilots may not be receiving
training. However, unlike experts, intermediate pilots may have not cultivated the necessary skill
to make safe decisions (Wiggins et al., 2002). O'Hare, et al., (1994) investigated accident data
and revealed, intermediate pilots incurred “goal formation errors” (e.g., Did the pilot choose a
goal which was feasible?, Is a missed approach feasible considering the current situation?) more
than procedural errors (e.g., Did the pilot execute procedures consistent with the selected
strategy?, Did the pilot complete all the procedural steps required to perform a missed
approach?) and action errors (e.g., Was the procedure executed as planned?, Was the pilot able to
complete this missed approach successfully?). Furthermore, goal formation errors were more
prevalent among accidents resulting in serious injuries and fatalities (O'Hare, et al., 1994).
The intermediate level of skill acquisition is analogous to the competent stage (Dreyfus &
Dreyfus, 1986), knowledge compilation stage (Anderson, 1983), rule stage (Rasmussen, 1983),
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or the associative stage (Fitts & Posner, 1967). All of these stages present an intermediate stage
of skill acquisition during which the person is heavily reliant on quantitative processes rather
than qualitative task specific processing (Wiggins et al., 2002). Intermediate operators have not
fully established efficient expert level qualitative information processing which is necessary to
process task related information and implement action effectively (Bell, 1997). This trend may
also be prevalent amongst GA pilots. GA weather-related accident data trends suggest GA
Private pilots account for the majority of weather-related and VFR into IMC accidents (Goh &
Wiegmann, 2002; FAA, 2010; Fultz & Ashley, 2016). This could be due to private pilots’
inability to process weather information and apply it to their flight effectively.
Previous research has investigated expertise with respect to the aviation weather task of
Preflight planning. Expertise and aviation weather knowledge can have direct implication on
preflight planning for inflight performance. Preflight planning is a complex task as the pilot must
integrate aeronautical information and weather information from various sources (Wiggins et al.,
2002). Wiggins et al., (2002) employed process tracing to analyze how novice, intermediate and
expert pilots accessed information for preflight planning. Process tracing allows researchers to
investigate operators’ problem solving based on the order of information acquisition while
completing a task (Svenson, 1979). Process tracing can provide insight into how novice,
intermediate, and expert pilots access information and make decisions during the preflight
process. Wiggins et al., (2002) results indicated that there were differences in information
acquisition efficiency between the three groups. Specifically, experts were able to identify
necessary information and integrate that information more effectively than intermediate pilots
(Wiggins et al., 2002).
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These results suggest that intermediate and novice pilots may have difficulty during the
preflight process due to their inability to access, interpret and apply weather information. Novice
and intermediate pilots may have challenges with the preflight process due to a lack of aviation
weather knowledge and poor understanding of product limitations (Blickensderfer et al., 2017).
Blickensderfer et al. (2017) and Burian & Jordan (2002) used written examinations to assess
pilots’ knowledge and skill regarding aviation weather. The evaluations included weather
patterns, weather hazards, weather services, weather regulations, weather product interpretation,
and weather-related decision-making. Both studies demonstrated that participants had a low
aviation weather knowledge, and in particular that pilots had difficulty answering weather
interpretation questions compared to weather principles and decision-making questions. Results
also revealed that formal aviation weather training alone increased aviation weather knowledge,
but flight experience alone did not necessarily increase weather knowledge.
Summary. In summary, research demonstrate most weather accidents occur for private pilots
without instrument (FAA, 2010). Additional research shows that expert pilots access weather
information differently from novice and intermediate pilots (Wiggins, 2014). Still other research
shows that pilots struggle to answer written questions about aviation weather and weather
product interpretation (Blickensderfer et. al, 2017). All of this can be leaving novice and
intermediate level pilots without the information they need to form adequate situation awareness
of the weather for their flights. In turn, poor situational awareness and cue association has been
highly linked to low experience and could have implications for GA flight operations.
Situational Awareness
Previous research also identifies situational awareness as a contributing factor for the
stagnant GA weather-related accident rate and VFR into IMC accidents (National Transportation
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Safety Board, 2005). Researchers suggest that pilots encounter VFR into IMC inadvertently and
may not be able to recognize the cues of IMC forming in their flight path. Situation assessment
research claims this inaccurate assessment of weather development may be related to poor
feature association formation in novice pilots (Ellis, 1996). This section briefly reviews
Situation Awareness function in GA hazardous weather-related accidents.
SA and experience may be a key factor in the assessment of weather phenomena
interpretation and recognition of deteriorating weather (Wiggins, 2014). Long-term memory and
cue utilization can help fill gaps of information from inadequate attention and working memory
(Wiggins, 2014). Therefore, if pilots lack knowledge of aviation weather principles, it could
hinder their abilities to use cue utilization and long-term memory to assess their situation.
Research has revealed differences between expert and novice weather phenomena feature
recognition (Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003). Which in turn, can determine the quality of weather
phenomena assessment while inflight.
When features in the operator’s external environment are related to internal knowledge from
past experiences, the resulting construct is a “cue”. Research suggests that these cues are used to
help direct human behavior and build mental models (Rosen et al., 2010; Wiggins, 2006, 2012;
Wiggins and O’Hare, 2003a). The strength of the relationship between cues can determine
whether pilots are able to perform efficient weather phenomena assessment (Wiggins, 2014).
These claims are consistent with the Endsley (1995) interpretation of situational awareness and
situation assessment, where operators take information from their external environment and
make connections with internal knowledge and behavior to predict the future state of the system
(Klein, 2008). The initial analysis of the current environment is termed situational assessment,
whereas, using that information to predict the future is prospective diagnosis (Uhlarik &
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Comerforf, 2002). The operators’ ability to perform accurate situation assessment and
prospective diagnosis is contingent on the operator’s development of feature-event relationships
(Wiggins, 2014). Research suggests, strong feature-event relationships are built through
exposure to the operational environment. Frequent exposure to the system or environment will
clarify feature-event associations, enabling the more experience pilots to respond to events more
accurately than those less experienced (Wiggins, 2014). This could provide insight into the high
GA Weather accident rate amongst low experienced pilots. Low experienced private pilots, due
to a lack of exposure, may not have strong cue association while inflight to assist with situation
assessment and weather avoidance.
Aviation Weather Situation Assessment Measures. Measuring diagnostic skills and situation
assessment is a challenge for general aviation weather research. Although research has been
invested into expertise and novice research, most of the expertise classifications have been a
priori by hours of experience performing a task. However, this method of assigning expertise is
based on length of experience, rather than, of quality of experience (Hoffman et al.,1995; O’Hare
et al.,1998). Wiggins (2014) claims diagnostic expertise is determined based on the development
of feature event associations and performance, rather than the operators’ amount of flight hours.
While it is difficult to determine an accurate response in operational environments, researchers
propose measuring diagnostic skills with response latency (Wiggins, 2016). However, response
latency may be a difficult measure to use in the context of weather. For instance, if the task
requires pilots to predict weather development and avoid deteriorating weather, how can one be
sure weather will develop into hazardous conditions without the pilot encountering the weather?
Wiggins (2014) employs this approach in most of his studies by investigating information
acquisition as a possible measure for diagnostic skills. This approach allows for evaluation of
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accuracy, behavior, and cue feature relationship (Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995; Wiggins, 2006,
2012). By capturing the selection and sequence of information acquisition, researchers are able
to understand the cues operators perceive as crucial for problem mitigation (Wiggins, 2014).
Moreover, operators’ information selection could depict expertise. This is especially informative
when assessing pilots’ decision-making in the preflight phase, where weather information is
acquired and flight route decisions are determined (Wiggins, 2014). The decisions made in
preflight could prevent VFR into IMC, and instead ensure safe flight operations.
Wiggins, Azar, & Loveday, (2012) investigated whether there is an association between
weather-related task-specific cue utilization and decision-making. Participants completed a
feature association task and a feature discrimination task, response and variance of responses
were measured for both tasks (Wiggins et al., 2012). The cue utilization responses were
compared to demographics and participants’ performance on a weather preflight scenario
(Wiggins et al., 2012). Results from both cue assessments revealed that experts were more
definitive in their responses resulting in more variance in their answers compared to non-experts.
Preflight and cue assessment results were fairly consistent; however, responses did not correlate
with flight hours and certification. Wiggins et al. (2012) claims, these results may be a predictor
of pilot preflight performance.
Wiggins, Azar, Hawken, Loveday, & Newman (2014) conducted another study to gain better
understanding of experts’ and non-experts cue and feature association when encountering
deteriorating weather conditions near their flight destination. Pilots received Expert Intensive
Skills Evaluation (EXPERTise) Situational Judgement Test (SJT), based on their composite
scores participants were organized into two categories. The assessment consisted of a feature
identification task, a feature association task, and a transition task (Wiggins et al., 2014). After
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being sorted into the two groups participants were required to review flight plan and weather, to
determine whether to undertake the simulated flight scenario (Wiggins et al., 2014). Then a
subset of the two groups were chosen to fly the in fight simulation. Weather in the scenario was
VR into IMC, the weather deteriorated close to the flight destination (Wiggins et al., 2014).
Results indicated participants in the less experienced cue utilization group decided not to embark
on the flight due to a lack of information. Where, the more experienced cue utilization group
were more likely to embark on the flight and fly into degrading weather conditions. However,
once again these results did not correlate with flight hours, risk perceptions or pilot certification
(Wiggins et al., 2014).
The lack of correlation between flight experience/pilot certification and aviation weather cue
utilization and decision-making could be related to the poor measures for aviation weather
situation and cue association assessment or it could support the suggestion that the traditional
means of aviation experience (flight hours and pilot certification) do not predict aviation weather
knowledge and skills. Instead maybe weather training or other factors should be considered when
predicting aviation weather knowledge and skills.
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Aviation Weather Cue-Based Training. Wiggins & O’Hare (2003) developed “weatherwise”, a cue-based training program to help pilots form stronger feature associations. Chansik
(2011) conducted a study to investigate how weather recognition training effects GA pilots’
situation assessment in deteriorating weather. After taking the course, pilots were assessed on
their ability to perceive changing weather conditions, risk perception, risk tolerance, and decision
accuracy (Chansik, 2011). Results indicated, the group that received the weather wise training
displayed significantly higher ceiling estimation and decision accuracy performance, however
there was no significant difference between groups on risk tolerance, risk assessment and
decision confidence Chansik, 2011).These results could support the notion weather training is
helpful to improve pilots’ aviation weather knowledge.
Summary. In summary, research has identified SA as a crucial component for the GA
weather-related accidents. Specifically, previous studies have evaluated pilots SA during preflight and simulated inflight within developing weather (Chansik, 2011; Wiggins et al., 2014;
Wiggins et al., 2012). Despite the various attempts to train and measure experience and weather
SA, the new proposed measurements have yet to correlate with traditional expertise
measurements (i.e. flight hours, pilot certification, etc.). This could support the claim that
traditional pilot expertise measures may be accurate for flight performance; however, they may
not be indicative of pilots’ aviation weather knowledge and weather SA. Additionally, with
mostly a priori weather SA assessments, there are limited measures available to validate new
aviation weather SA measures. Furthermore, the limited measures available for both aviation
weather knowledge and situation assessment provide is little explanation as to why low
experienced pilots account for the majority of aviation weather-related accidents. However, risk
has been identified as a contributing factor to GA weather-related accidents. Therefore, it is
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imperative to investigate how risk and poor pilot judgement relate to GA low experience pilots
and weather-related accidents.
Risk Assessment
Risk assessment has been linked to poor pilot judgment of GA scenarios, which may lead to
possible weather avoidance errors (O’Hare 1990). Most of the aviation risk related literature
address operators’ behavior in risky situations by considering risk from two different, yet
associated concepts: perception and tolerance.
Risk perception and Risk Tolerance. Risk perception is defined as the ability to identify and
evaluate risk associated with hazardous events (Hunter, 2002). Brown & Groeger (1988) theorize
that risk perception is comprised of information gathered from the environmental hazards and the
operator’s abilities. For example, less experienced operators may not have the ability to
efficiently assess hazards and risks. In other words, if pilots lack a developed understanding of
how weather develops and effects flight, it may hinder accurate and effective risk perception
(Hunter, 2002). Consider VFR into IMC. Less experienced pilots may not pick up on cues in
the environment that indicate hazardous weather is developing. To effectively assess risks,
operators need to be able to appropriately perceive external situations (Hunter, 2002). Improper
evaluation of the weather situation may result in an underrated understanding of the hazards
involved in the situation and may result in an over-estimated confidence in individual skills to
navigate the situation (Hunter, 2002). Overestimation of personal pilot skills has been cited as a
contributor to VFR into IMC accidents, but again, this may be a result of a misperception of the
risks associated with aviation weather.
Risk tolerance is more difficult to define, as risk tolerance is reliant on personal
characteristics and internal factors (Hunter, 2002). Previous research suggests that risk tolerance
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can be mediated by the value affiliated with the goal or task, and risk tolerance may change
depending on the situation. For instance, the same individual may have low risk tolerance when
taking a trip to the grocery store to pick up an item that they could buy another time and the same
person may exhibit a high risk tolerance when evacuating due to an impending severe storm.
(Hunter, 2002).
With respect to aviation weather, if pilots misinterpret cues, they may not have accurate risk
perception. As a result, a lack of aviation weather knowledge, and poor cue feature association
may have an influence on pilots’ risk tolerance. Knecht (2008) claims that experience in certain
weather phenomena can influence subsequent pilot decision-making and how they use weatherrelated information. Operators need to be able to identify weather risks and mitigate the situation
(Ferraro, Vandyke, Zander, Anderson, & Kuehlen, 2015).
Hunter (2002) investigated whether risk perception and risk tolerance have separate effects
on pilot decision-making. Results indicated that there was a negative relationship between pilot
risk perception and risk tolerance (i.e., as risk perception increased, risk tolerance decreased).
Therefore, pilots who are not sensitive perceivers of risk in hazardous weather, may also have a
tendency to take higher risks in other tasks and situations. In congruence with the principles of
the zero risk theory, a higher level of risk was associated with a lower perception of risk.
However, student pilots also displayed low level of perceived risk. Hunter (2002) explains
student pilots may be too novice to accurately assess risk. Previous research suggests that risk
perception matures as the operator gains more experience with their task and their environment
(Jensen et al.’s 1997; Wiggins and O’Hare’s 2003). Risk has previously been measured through
pilots rating risks in simulated flight scenarios (e.g., Hunter, 2002; O’Hare, 1990). This measure,
however, did not account for the accuracy of the risk appraisal. Researchers claim it is difficult
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to determine the correct level of risk perception, as often there is no definite “correct” perception
of risk (Weiss & Shanteau, 2003). Different pilots apply different factors to decision-making,
this can make the decision-making process very dynamic and difficult to predict (Knecht, Harris,
& Shappell, 2004).
Finally, Ferraro, Vandyke, Zander, Anderson, & Kuehlen (2015) compared risk assessment
ratings of weather by non-aviation experienced students to aviation experienced students. Results
revealed that aviation experienced participants rated weather-related scenarios as riskier than
non-aviation experienced participants. However, the pilots’ overall risk perception declined with
more flight and simulated flight hours, which may suggest that risk perception should be
continuously trained (Ferraro et al., 2015).
Summary. In summary, previous research has associated poor risk perception and risk
tolerance with low experience pilots. If low experienced pilots have poor knowledge of aviation
principles it could hinder their ability to understand the risks associated with weather conditions
and their effect on aircraft performance. When pilots enter weather conditions, unaware of its
effect on flight, pilots may encounter hazardous weather phenomena.
Weather Technology
Weather technology and weather products have become a crucial component of the preflight
process. During the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, researchers and engineers introduced a variety
of graphical weather products in an attempt to give GA pilots access to more usable weather
information (Tallotta et al., 1997). Early research results revealed that pilots with graphical
weather information systems (GWIS) had better awareness of weather and less dependence on
ground weather professionals, but this was accompanied with higher workload (Yucknovicz et
al., 2000). Although the introduction of GWIS as well as radar (e.g., NEXRAD) have the ability
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to increase pilots’ awareness and decrease weather information retrieval time, researchers have
found repeatedly that pilots may use these devices to actually fly closer to hazardous weather
conditions and maneuver around them (Latorella & Chamberlain, 2002; Yuchnovicz et al., 2001;
Berringer and Ball, 2004). Latorella & Chamberlain (2004) claim the NEXRAD display of storm
cell location, intensity, and position in relation to the aircraft, made it easier for pilots to use the
interface more strategically (Latorella & Chamberlain, 2004).
Previous studies investigated how much degraded radar resolution affects pilots’ weather
interpretation and decision-making (Latorella & Chamberlain, 2004). Results indicated that
higher resolution NEXRAD radar images encouraged pilots to use technology tactically to
maneuver through hazardous weather. Latorella & Chamberlain (2004; 2002) called for more
research with high resolution radar images and IMC conditions to further explore this notion.
Beringer and Ball (2004) also investigated the ranges of NEXRAD spatial resolution. Results
were similar to Latorella & Chamberlain (2002) in that pilots who accessed higher resolution
used the information to maneuver around and dodge hazardous weather (Beringer and Ball,
2004) . In fact, the majority of pilots in the study violated the 20 statute mile distance from
storms (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] & National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration [NOAA], 1983). This is similar to the findings in Wu, Gooding, Shelley, Duong,
and Johnson (2012), where under similar conditions, pilots flew within the FAA suggested 20
statue mile distance of convective weather, and disregarded hazardous weather avoidance
practices. Burgess & Thomas (2004) assessed the effect of new, innovative cockpit displays on
pilot decision-making and weather avoidance. This study compared a novice display featuring
NEXRAD image loop to a National Convective Weather Forecast. Results indicated no
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significant difference between groups’ weather avoidance performance regardless of condition
(Burgess & Thomas, 2004).
Portable Weather Technology. Recently the GA community has been investing in lower cost
portable devices that map weather information along flight routes to improve pilots weather SA
and weather avoidance. The majority of the portable weather technology (e.g. Foreflight) that are
currently available are weather apps on tablets, smart phones, or smart watches. Industry is
introducing more aviation weather apps each year (Dutcher & Doiron, 2008). However,
researchers have identified various human factors issues associated with portable weather
devices. For example, Schaub, Karl, and Weber (2010) found a lack of standardized training,
device size, warning messages, and navigation all pose limitations to pilots’ ability to use
portable weather devices.
Additionally, Ahlstrom et al.(2016) investigated the effect of portable weather devices on
GA pilot behaviors, GA pilot weather situational awareness, and weather avoidance. Results,
indicated the portable device increased pilots’ weather situation awareness. Also, the
introduction of the portable device did not degrade pilot performance (Ahlstrom et al., 2016) .
However, pilots still operated too close to degraded weather. As with other weather products and
technology, any possible beneficial effects of weather apps may be limited by pilots lack of
weather knowledge and device training (Ahlstrom et al., 2016). Ahlstrom et al.(2016) advocated
for more research on aviation weather information interpretation training (Ahlstrom et al., 2016).
Summary. Recently, research has attempted to improve preflight and inflight performance
through new weather technology with improved usability. However, despite the advances in
technology and weather product display, pilots often utilize the weather information to fly closer
to deteriorating weather. GWIS and portable weather technology both have benefits and
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limitations for presenting weather along pilots’ flight route. Latorella & Chamberlain (2002)
claim that GWIS should assist pilots with realizing how weather conditions relate to the overall
flight mission, this includes assisting pilots in predicting how weather will develop in the future,
identifying when weather is hazardous, and suggesting actions (Latorella & Chamberlain, 2002).
However, previous research confirms that GWIS and portable weather applications do not assist
pilots in safely navigating around hazardous weather. In fact, multiple studies claim GWIS may
promote tactical maneuvers too close to degrading weather. Weather technology does not seem
to mitigate pilots’ decision-making, situation assessment, and product interpretation errors.
Furthermore, low experienced pilots poor preflight and inflight behavior does not seem to be
mitigated through better weather technology. New technology may be unable to improve pilots
understanding of weather and preflight performance due to pilot’s lack of ability to interpret
weather products and understand basic weather theory.
As aforementioned, product interpretation can be difficult for many reasons, pilots would
need to understand product symbols, limitations, and application. Additionally, with the various
products available, aviation weather principles may be very difficult for pilots to comprehend
and apply. However, if pilots had access to a preflight planning guide to assist with product
interpretation, pilots may be able to properly interpret products and gain understanding of
product limitations.
Pilots may also benefit from assistance with preflight planning tasks. It can be very
challenging to understand which products to access and how to apply information to a flight plan
(Wiggins et al., 2002). Novice pilots in particular struggle with goal formation decisions and
information application (O'Hare, et al., 1994). On the other hand, if pilots were able to receive
help through this process, pilots could practice perceiving preflight tasks as experts do.
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Repetition of effective preflight practices could give pilots the experience to gain stronger
feature associations and may help pilots associate appropriate risk with weather phenomena.
In turn, effective preflight practices will likely lead to effective inflight processes and decisionmaking. If pilots frame their weather-related diversions and alternate routes in terms of a “gain”
instead of a loss, pilots may be less likely to continue into deteriorating weather. Therefore,
through pilots practicing performing preflight planning using a “gains” mentality, this attitude
may continue during inflight operations. Also, helping pilots plan diversions and alternate routes
in case of emergency may encourage pilots to be more aware and proactive about hazardous
weather inflight.
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate whether the use of an aviation weather
performance support tool would improve pilots preflight planning and inflight behavior.
Aviation Weather Preflight Performance Support Tool Literature Review
Automation and decision support tools have been applied to the aviation field; however, the
application has been used primarily for navigational and aeronautical tasks. There is limited
research on applying information and decision automation application to aviation weather
planning and decision-making. It is possible that by applying automation and decision support
tool technology to aviation weather interpretation and planning, pilots’ preflight and inflight
performance may improve. This section will review automation and decision support tool
literature to determine which aspects and components will aid in assisting with the GA weather
problem.
Automation. Automation has been defined as the employment of automatic equipment into
manufacturing or other processes. Automation levels and stages are used together to describe
automated systems and tasks, and a particular system or process can be automated on varying
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levels and types of automation. Automation levels range from low to high automation
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). Hence, the automation type has four stages that
mimic the information processing model, sensory processing, perception/working memory,
decision-making, and response selection.
The first stage describes automation applied to information sensing and registration
processes. These processes and tasks involve sensory receptor, sensory processing,
preprocessing, and selective attention (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). For instance,
an example of a task in this stage would be the ordering or sequencing, information, such as the
ordered response received from a Google search. In this task, automated algorithms sense the
desired information from the user’s search term, and organize the information according to the
most relevant information. At the very lowest level, this automation stage could represent the
sensing of information, such as a temperature reading on a thermometer. This level of assistance
automation could help prevent pilots from missing vital weather information. That is, previous
research suggests that information acquisition is a task particularly difficult for
novice/intermediate GA pilots. However, when completing the preflight process gathering
weather information is crucial to an effective preflight weather plan. Automation could help
guide pilots on which weather products to access for preflight.
The second stage of automation is processing and integration of information. This stage
applies inferences to information, allowing for prediction (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens,
2000; Baddeley, 1996). For instance, when users begin to enter a search term into Google,
Google usually offers suggested terms to assist with their search. This function helps users better
word their search terms, which in turn, can help users get better results. This stage of automation
is also used in aviation weather. For instance, when sensors collect raw visibility and ceiling
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information, such as “4 statute miles” and “overcast at 3,000 ft”, the code can sense this
information and translate it into flight category, IFR or VFR. This may help eliminate error and
provide assistance to novice pilots who are still learning flight category criteria.
The third stage of automation mirrors the decision-selection stage of the information
processing model, where a decision is chosen from decision options (Parasuraman, Sheridan, &
Wickens, 2000). Applying this stage of automation could involve varying levels of automation.
A low level of automation would suggest action(s) to the user, whereas high levels of automation
would make the decision. This level of automation is rarely used in aviation tools. However, one
example could be the autopilot function when the system makes decisions about how to mitigate
shifts in altitude and direction from environmental stimuli. Autopilot systems take into account
weather phenomena, such as winds and pressure, and select the most efficient way to stay on
course.
Lastly, the fourth stage “action implementation,” describes the task of completing a decided
action (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). This stage is analogous to the action
implementation step in the information processing model (Bennett & Flach, 1992). During this
stage, instead of the human operator performing the action, automation uses mechanical
hardware and software to execute the decided task. One primary example of automation stage in
aviation is autopilot. Autopilot often decides and implements actions to navigate in response to
environmental stimuli (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).
The levels and stages can be combined in one system, with a system having multiple levels
and stages of automation to meet the various system demands (Parasuraman, Sheridan, &
Wickens, 2000). For instance, consider the product “Google Home” (2018). Google Home has
varying levels of automations to meet different user needs. Google Home can complete action
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implementation by executing a user demand, such as a user requesting a song to be played, or
Google Home could perform decision selection and action implementation. The user could
request Google Home to play a Jazz song and Google Home would select a Jazz song and play it.
Furthermore, effective application of the various levels and stages of automation to various tasks
is crucial for effective human and system performance.
Automation levels and stages have numerous implications for human and system
performance (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). Previous research has investigated
automation’s effect on four main human performance areas: mental workload, situation
awareness, complacency, and skill degradation (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).
First, consider the effect of automation on mental workload. Specifically, well-designed
“information automation” can reduce operator mental workload so that tasks can be performed
more effectively (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). Data summaries, information
highlighting, and integration can all help reduce operator workload. Information automation has
been applied to different fields of aviation such as air traffic control. For example, air traffic
control now has data blocks that features airplane speed, direction, and aircraft type on their
scope of airplanes in their sector. This reduces workload because the information is
automatically fed to the operator’s screen, instead of the operator having to ask the pilot for the
information. Information automation can present information in a useful manner by priority and
relevance which can help the operator make better decisions.
However, if levels and stages are incorrectly applied to tasks, automation can lead to an
increase in mental workload. Specifically, automation can add more mental workload if it is
difficult to start and engage, and this could lead to more costs to human performance, such as
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situational awareness, complacency, and skill degradation (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens,
2000).
Additionally, situation awareness should be considered when applying automation to tasks.
Previous studies found that decision automation could limit operators’ situation awareness of the
current operational environment. As a result, operators may be less aware of changes in their
environment and unequipped to handle hazardous situations (Kaber, Omal, & Endsley, 1999;
Endsley, 1996; Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Sarter & Woods, 1995). Therefore, when applying
decision automation instead of allowing the operator to be passive, engineers should attempt to
engage the operator to preserve situational awareness.
Another issue is the effect of automation on human complacency. If a high level of
automation is applied to a task, the operator could over-rely on the automation and fail to
identify automation errors (Wiener, 1981; Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993). For instance,
when using autopilot, pilots may become complacent and fail to remain vigilant of the systems’
status. This could leave room for possible erroneous performance. Complacency may also be
prevalent when applying automation cueing (i.e., highlighting important cues to attract the
operator’s attention). Previous studies have identified that the employment of automated cue
guiding could result in operators paying inadequate attention to the “un-cued” components of the
task (Yeh, Wickens, & Seagull, 1999). Therefore, although operators may improve in some
previously overseen aspect of a task, they may underperform on certain areas of a task they once
mastered. Research suggest that the effects of complacency are greater with decision automation
rather than information automation. Additionally, when automation is completely reliable, both
information automation and decision automation equally increase human behavior (Crocoll &
Coury, 1990). However, unreliability seems to negatively affect human behavior.

49

Automation research has also investigated automation effects on skill degradation. Decision
automation could eventually lead to operator skill degradation (Rose, 1989). This could be
prevalent especially with respect to disuse of automation (Kaber, Omal, & Endsley, 1999).
When considering the multiple possible costs of high level decision automation,
complacency, situational awareness, and skill degradation, it is imperative to appropriately apply
automation to avoid these potential performance costs. These costs could be particularly harmful
in high risk and high workload environments, such as general aviation. Therefore, automation
reliability and trust should be considered before automation assignment in aviation
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).
Trust and Reliability. Trust is another important construct to monitor when automating tasks.
Depending on the reliability of automation and the nature of the tasks, trust can have an effect on
human performance (Lee & See, 2004). Operators can have a lack of trust in an automated
system, and instead of working with the automation, operators can waste time double checking
the automated systems’ performance (Lee & See, 2004). This could lead to error, higher
workload, and hazardous events. However, it is also possible operators can over rely on
automation, which can also lead to erroneous behavior (Lee & See, 2004). It is important to
produce reliable automation; research suggests that trust increases with unreliability and false
alarms (Lee & See, 2004).
In summary, previous studies warn that the potential benefits of automation may also come
with limitations or costs of applying automation. When applying automation, it is important to be
cognizant of automation costs and mitigate them effectively. Carefully designed automation,
however, may prove a useful tool to assist GA novice/intermediate pilots to understand aviation
weather ant implications for flight. Since novice/intermediate pilots struggle with information
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acquisition, comprehension, and application, perhaps applying the appropriate level of
automation to various aviation weather tasks would help improve pilot preflight planning.
Automation may be best applied through a decision support tool. Decision support tool
automation assists the user with completing tasks and making decisions and have been used in
aviation and healthcare to help guide operators through tasks for years. The next section will
review decision support tool literature to investigate the feasibility of applying this technology to
aviation weather product interpretations, application, and preflight planning.
Decision Support Tools. Decision Support Systems (DSS) are computer-based systems that
aid operators in problem solving and decision-making tasks (Power & Sharda, 2009). In order to
assist the user with making informed decisions, these systems often use a combination of data,
documents, knowledge, and model algorithms. Essentially, DSS are designed to support and
facilitate the decision process and adapt to fit the operator’s needs. Although DSS use
automation to help the user make a decision, unlike decision automation, DSS do not make the
decision for the operator.
While various types of DSS that help support decision-making exist, the particular type of
DSS of interest in the current study are knowledge driven DSS (Power & Sharda, 2009). Instead
of using data and models like other DSS, knowledge driven/ expert DSS help provide operators
with information concerning their task and suggest action to the operator. A knowledge driven
DSS provides specified expertise in a certain topic and is equipped to help the operator
understand and solve problems within that field. In addition to the data, document and
knowledge driven DSS, there are also general and function-task specific DSS (Power & Sharda,
2009). Function-task specific DSS are developed to support tasks and decision-making in a
particular domain. This type of DSS is most useful when used to assist an operator to complete a
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routine process or decision task. In contrast, general DSS support very broad tasks such as
business management and business intelligence. Both function-task specific and general DSS can
be data, document, model, or knowledge driven (Power & Sharda, 2009). The DSS of primary
interest for this paper is Function-task specific knowledge driven DSS for aviation weather
preflight planning.
Although DSS have been theorized to help operators through the decision process, there are
challenges associated with introducing DSS into existing complex systems and/or tasks (Cohen,
Parasuraman, Serfaty, & Andes, 1997). Misuse of the DSS can actually decrease human machine
performance and introduce new errors (e.g., over reliance, complacency and a degraded skill,
degraded vigilance). How operators use DSS can be heavily influenced by under-trust and overtrust of the system (Lee & Moray, 1992; Roth, Bennett, & Woods, 1988). One reason underlying
the problems with trust between operators and DSS can be a result of a poorly developed mental
model of how the DSS functions (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Fortunately, effective training on
how to properly use DSS to assist with the decision process improves efficient human machine
interaction with DSS (Cohen, Parasuraman, Serfaty, & Andes, 1997).
Another factor for a decrease in performance could be “cognitive misers.” Cognitive misers,
are individuals who try to perform tasks with the least amount of cognitive work as possible.
This can lead to operators using DSS as a sort of heuristic and decrease the operators’ system
situational awareness and decision-making. In these situations, human-machine teamwork can
actually decrease productivity, and cause the human operator to be less vigilant and perform with
less effort (Cohen, Parasuraman, Serfaty, & Andes, 1997).
Clinical Decision Support Systems in Health Care. Despite the challenges associated with
Decision Support tools/systems, knowledge-based decision support systems, clinical decision
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support systems (CDSS) have been used in the medical field for the last 40 years (Barness,
Tunnessen, Worely, Simmons, & Ringe,1974; Miller, Chanllinor, Masarie, & Myers, 1986).
These systems were designed to aid physicians and assistants with diagnosis and other patient
care processes. CDSS are usually composed of three primary components, the knowledge base,
inference or reasoning, and the user interface. The “knowledge base” consists of relevant content
and knowledge in an IF, THEN, and ELSE format. The “reasoning” component contains
algorithms for combining rules and exceptions to assist the user. Lastly, the interface is how the
user sends information to and receives information from the decision support system. System
feedback can vary from recommendations, to alerts, and other information.
Although, the medical field has applied CDSS to medical operations, there is limited research
investigating the effectiveness of CDSS. There is also a lack of research investigating the exact
impact and use of clinical decision support tools. For example, KLAS (2003) reviewed a site that
used COPE systems that employed CDSS to apply alarms, decision aiding logic, and knowledge
systems to reduce errors during ordering process. Results indicated that many sites only used ten
or less alerts during order processes. This resistance to using alarms or alerts is a common
response to automation and alarms, as users may distrust the system’s suggestions and alerts
when they differ from the operators own assessment.
Eccles, McColl, Steen, et al., (2002) analyzed the effects of a guideline-based decision
support system in 31 general practice settings. Results indicated the CDSS system intervention
had minimal improvement on health outcomes. A more detailed investigation revealed,
practitioners failed to use the CDSS. In fact, practitioners often overrode and ignored system
alerts and suggestions. This lack of use or misuse of CDSS systems could be linked to poor
system design and inadequate CDSs training. Teich et al. (2000) suggests that CDSS are most
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effective when they align with the physician’s mental models and do not require them to change
their processes.
Additionally, there is also significant lack of research evaluating the effectiveness of CDSS
that are broadly applied. Dombal (1991) and Adams, Chan, Cliffod et al., (1986) investigated the
effectiveness of Leeds University CDSS for acute abdomen diagnosis. Additionally, results
indicated that at the original site, where the decision aid was developed and implemented
diagnosis, decision-making and patient outcome improved. Although the system performed well
in the original local site of introduction, once applied to other sites the success rate decreased.
However, despite the lack of literature regarding decision support tool effectiveness, The Office
of the National Coordinator (ONC) for health information technology reported that 74 percent of
physicians use a clinical decision support system the assists with drug interactions and effects
and 57% use at least one clinical decision support tool that provides guidance and suggestions
for screening tasks. This gap between research literature and commercial use of DSS is relevant
in the aviation field and other fields as well.
DSS Design. DSS design has implications for the effectiveness of the tool for the current
study. It is crucial that DSS present task-related information in a useful and strategic manner,
using heuristics strategies (e.g., using an “elimination by aspect” strategy to develop the interface
design), that assist in user engagement and decision error avoidance (Karim, Hershauer, &
Perkins, 1998). Although, implementing heuristic strategies in DSS design could prove useful, it
is imperative that the implemented heuristics strategies match the needs of the user base.
Arbitrarily assigning heuristics strategies to DSS design could result in a mismatch between use
needs and system design and could promote more hazardous performance (Vicente, 1999).
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In the aviation field, Wiggins & Bollwerk (2006), investigated user preferences for including
heuristics information DSS design. During their study, participants were tasked to evaluate
various airports and their features in order to decide the optimal airport for flight safety and
scenario goals. While completing this task, participants had the opportunity to interact with three
different heuristic DSS interfaces. Afterwards, participants were asked which interface they
preferred and which one they would use again. Results indicated interface choice was unrelated
to decision accuracy, experience, demographic information, or information presentation
effectiveness. Instead, interface preference was related to user perceived difficulty in comparing
alternative airport features (e.g. runway information, landing fees, and maintenance facilities).
Additionally, interface choice did indicate differences in information acquisition efficiency.
Specifically, the “elimination by aspects” design took users more time to compare feature
options than the “frequency and majority of confirming dimensions” interface did (Wiggins &
Bollwerk, 2006).
To further investigate user differences and interface preference, Harris & Wiggins (2008)
investigated whether polychronicity (i.e., the preference for completing multiple tasks
concurrently, instead of sequentially) could provide insight on user preference for heuristics
preferences for DSS interfaces. However, results indicated there was no relationship between
polychronicty and DSS interface design. Similar to Wiggins & Bollwek (2006), results indicated
participant chose the interface that seemed less difficult, elimination by aspects (Harris &
Wiggins, 2008).
Perry, Wiggins, Childs, & Fogarty (2013) furthered this research by investigating the effect
of various decision support system interface designs on inexperienced firefighters’ decisionmaking. For this study, participants were tasked with completing a decision task. The
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experimental conditions in this study included training (training vs. control), and DSS interfaces
(quasi-analytical & intuitive), and the amount of control users had over the displayed information
(pre-configured & self-configured). The two interface designs used in the study were the quasi
analytical interface (access to information for 8 cues) and the intuitive interface (access to
information for 3 cues). Participants were separated into two interface design groups and the
control (no training) and training groups. Although training and DSS interfaces alone did not
impact decision accuracy, pilots who received the intuitive interface, training and preconfiguration had improved decision accuracy. Overall their results indicated that decision
support systems influenced users to perform better decision accuracy and efficiency when the
system is preconfigured and effectively highlights important cues.
Lastly, Wiggins’ team revaluated user preference and accuracy in using various decision
support tool interfaces in various stressful conditions (Morrison, Wiggins, & Porter, 2010).
During the study, 40 crime scene investigators used DSS to access information and make
decisions. For the first phase participants were introduced to each DSS interface. There were
three DSS interfaces available: paired options-moderate control (majority of confirming
dimensions), all options-full control (elimination by aspects), all options –limited control
(satisficing) (Morrison, Wiggins, & Porter, 2010). During the second phase, participants chose
their preferred DSS interface and used that interface to complete decision-making tasks with
varying levels of time pressure. Results from the study revealed that “all options-full control”
was the preferred DSS interface amongst users in in the low time pressure condition (Morrison,
Wiggins, & Porter, 2010). While the preference for the all options-full control was not
significant, this option was preferred during the high-pressure condition. The results support the
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theory that user perception of difficulty of use and autonomy within the DSS were more valued
than efficiency for preference in DSS interface design (Morrison, Wiggins, & Porter, 2010).
Wiggins and his teams’ work investigated applying different heuristic-based strategies into
decision support tool development. Decision support systems (DSS) have the capability to
relieve workload, reduce decision related errors, and assist with information acquisition
(Workman, 2005). However, as indicated through prior research, without considering user
autonomy, transparency, and adaptability in DSS design, automation limitations may outweigh
the benefits. Hopefully through including these design elements, DSS will have better usability
and user acceptance.
DSS for Preflight Weather Tasks. Previous research suggests when implementing decision
support tools or decision aids to consider several key variables: the level of automation, decision
aid content/ subject matter expert involvement, usability and adaptability. These factors will be
discussed with respect to applying DSS to weather preflight tasks to improve preflight and
inflight performance.
As described earlier, during the preflight process, pilots have difficulty with the task of
product interpretation and selection. If automation were applied to this task, a useful support
system would suggest which weather products are essential for the pilot’s flight plan. The
support system could also prompt the pilots to think about the weather information the way an
expert would. That is, by offering tips and guidance, the support system could function like a
coach or smart checklist to ensure the novice pilot is performing efficient information acquisition
and conceptualizing the retrieved information. This type of automation would be mid-level
information acquisition and analysis, where, the automated system is suggesting how novice
pilots should access and interpret weather products. This type of automation is more effective

57

than high level type decision automation, where the automation makes decisions for the user
(Shimon, 2009).
Unfortunately, a possible negative effect of a DSS could be complacency and skill
degradation (Wiener, 1981; Parasuraman, Molloy, &Singh, 1993). In terms of aviation weather,
a novice pilot may be over-reliant on the support tool for assistance with interpreting weather
products and attempts to interpret weather products without the support of the preflight decision
aid, their performance may decrease instead of increase and, overtime, the novice pilot could
become too dependent on the decision support tool. However, research suggests that
complacency and overreliance issues are more common with decision automation rather than
information automation (Crocoll & Coury, 1990). And helping pilots by providing weather
information automation could be well worth the risk of overreliance.
Another way to mitigate risks with automation is to train users how to use the tool
effectively. For example, when considering a decision support tool to aid low experienced pilots
with the preflight process, the pilot must know how much assistance the system is able to
provide. Pilots should not rely on the system to make decisions or provide feedback on their
decisions if the systems’ only purpose is to provide informative suggestions. A discrepancy
between user expectations and system performance can cause confusion and error prone activity
(Cohen et. al, 1997). However, if users (in this case pilots) are trained how to use the product, the
decision support tool could considerably reduce error and improve operations (Cohen et. al,
1997).
Content validity and user-centered design are also crucial for supporting human and decision
support tool performance (Cohen et. al, 1997). Function and task specific decision support tools
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use “experienced knowledge” to assist operators when performing tasks (Shimon, 2009).
Therefore, the content validly of the knowledge-based information is crucial for improved
performance. For example, a preflight decision support tool requires correct aviation and
meteorological “knowledge” to help the pilots make informed decisions concerning their flight.
If the system lacks accurate aviation or weather knowledge principles, it may leave the novice
user unprepared to perform their tasks effectively. As a result, a tool that was designed to
decrease workload and increase performance could actually hinder safe flight activity and
introduce even more confusion to an already complicated environment. Therefore, multidisciplinary teams are essential for ensuring content validity and system design. Both expert
pilots and meteorologists are needed to verify the system is capable of providing proper guidance
for novice users.
Usability and human-centered design are important principles to consider during decision
support tool development (Cohen et. al, 1997). Technology is too often applied to complex
environments without taking the user into consideration. In the GA weather community, vendors
continually attempt to improve technology to assist with pilots’ preflight and inflight
performance. However, new weather technology such as RADAR and overlaid dynamic maps
may actually encourage hazardous flight activity rather than prevent it (Latorella & Chamberlain,
2002; Yuchnovicz et al., 2001; Beringer and Ball, 2004). Previous research indicates that pilots
with dynamic weather in the cockpit actually flew closer to degrading weather, compared to the
control group (Latorella & Chamberlain, 2002; Yuchnovicz et al., 2001; Beringer and Ball,
2004). Instead of repeating previous mistakes, developers of aviation weather decision support
tools must consider the pilot needs early in the design process. Increased system usability could
assist with system transparency and trust (Cohen et. al, 1997). Furthermore, the more user
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friendly the system is, the more transparent the systems’ functions will be for the pilot.
Research also suggests that facilitating decision support tool automation customization could
improve system transparency and human-machine interaction (Billings & Woods, 1994). For
instance, if a novice pilot needs assistance with risk assessment but was improving on their
product interpretation skills, the pilot could adjust the preflight decision support tool automation
to focus on risk assessment rather than product interpretation (e.g., low automation on product
interpretation and medium automation on risk assessment tasks). This way, the pilot can practice
using their skills during product interpretation and receive more assistance with risk assessment.
When implemented correctly, system customization could help specialize the decision support
tool to effectively meet the users’ knowledge and skill deficiencies (Cohen et. al, 1997).
Overall Literature Review Summary
GA weather-related accidents have a sustained a very high fatality over the last 30 years.
Further investigation into the accident data revealed, VFR into IMC accidents account for the
majority of weather-related fatalities. Furthermore, low experienced private pilots have been
hypothesized to have low aviation weather knowledge, poor weather SA, and inadequate aviation
weather risk perception. Although there is limited research that assesses GA pilots’ weather
knowledge and situation assessment, research claims poor aviation knowledge may be the
underlying reason for poor pilot judgement, risk perception, and inadequate situation assessment.
As a result, low experienced pilots may be incapable of proper preflight planning and weather
avoidance due to their poor feature and cue association development. This may have severe
consequences for inflight operations and may lead to fatal weather-related accidents. Moreover, a
poor understanding of weather products and theory, may result in pilots having a limited mental
map of inflight weather. Consequently, a lack of weather situational awareness may lead to
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poor decision-making and error. It may be beneficial to consider new methods towards
improving low experienced pilots’ aviation weather practices. Perhaps by providing pilots with a
performance support tool to aid them in the preflight process, pilots’ understanding of weather,
decisions, and inflight weather-related behavior may improve. Thus, decision support tool
technology could assist novice/intermediate pilots through the aviation weather preflight process.
To ensure the effectiveness of the Preflight Decision Support Tool, developers should consider
decision aid content/ subject matter expert involvement, usability, and adaptability. Additionally,
possible automation limitations, such as situational awareness decrements, complacency, and
skill degradation, should be carefully monitored. If all of these factors are considered, a DSS
could be an effective option for assisting low hour novice pilots with preflight and inflight
performance and weather avoidance.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of a Preflight Weather Decision Support
Tool (PWDST) on participants’ preflight performance and inflight performance. For the purpose
of this study, preflight and inflight performance will be operationally defined by three main
principles, weather conditions assessment, risk assessment, and decision-making.
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Figure 3. Dissertation Theoretical Model

Therefore, this study will investigate the following hypotheses (see figure 3):
Hypotheses Relating to Preflight
The Preflight Weather Decision Support Tool will have a positive effect on participant’s
preflight performance. Participants who use the tool will have better preflight performance than
participants without the tool: Information Acquisition, Weather Awareness, Risk Perception,
and Decision Making (see figure 4).
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Figure 4. Preflight Hypothesis Model H1, H2, H3, H4

•

Hypothesis 1 (H1). Participants who use the tool will access a greater amount of key
products during preflight than participants without the tool.
o IV: The Tool
o DV: The percentage of crucial weather products that were accessed.

Participants who use the tool will demonstrate a more accurate understanding of present and
trending weather along the flight route than those participants who do not use the tool.
Specifically:
•

Hypothesis 2a (H2A). Participants who use the tool will score higher on Subcategory
Weather Phenomena in the Weather Assessment on the Post Preflight Survey than those
participants who do not use the tool.
•

IV: The Tool

•

DV: Percent correct score on Subcategory Weather Phenomena Category
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on the Post Preflight Survey
•

Hypothesis 2b (H2B). Participants who use the tool will score higher on Subcategory
Weather Trending in in the Weather Assessment on the Post Preflight Survey than
participants who do not use the tool.
•

IV: The Tool

•

DV: Percent correct Score on Subcategory Weather Trending on Post
Preflight Survey

•

Hypothesis 3 (H3). Participants who use the tool will have more accurate risk perception
concerning weather along their flight route than participants who do not use the tool.
Participants who use the tool will score higher score on Risk Perception on the Post
Preflight Survey than participants who do not use the tool.

•

•

IV: The Tool

•

DV: Percent correct score on Risk Perception on the Post Preflight Survey

Hypothesis 4 (H4). Participants who use the tool will make safer decisions during the
preflight process than participants who do not use the tool. Participants who use the tool
will score higher on Decision Making on the Post Preflight Survey than participants who
do not use the tool.
•

IV: The Tool

•

DV: Decision Making Go or no-go decision

Hypotheses Relating to Inflight
Participants who used the tool will have an output that will enable them to be more aware
of weather conditions along their flight route than participants who do not use the tool (see figure
5).
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Specifically:

Figure 5. Inflight Hypothesis Model H5 and H6

•

Hypothesis 5a (H5A). Participants who use the tool will score higher the Weather
Subcategory Inflight Weather Phenomena on the post-inflight survey than participants
without the tool.
o IV: The Tool (Output)
o DV: Percent correct score on Subcategory Weather Phenomena on the
Post Inflight Survey

•

Hypothesis 5b (H5B). Participants who use the tool will score higher on the Weather
Subcategory Inflight Weather Trending in the post-inflight survey than those participants
who do not use the tool.
o IV: The Tool(Output)
o DV: Percent correct score on Subcategory Weather Trending in the Post
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Inflight Survey
Participants who use the tool will have a better understanding of weather risks along their
flight route than participants who do not use the tool. Specifically:
•

Hypothesis 6 (H6). Participants who use the tool will spend less time flying into
degraded weather conditions than those participants who do not use the tool.
o IV: The Tool (Output)
o DV: Decision Making (Time Weather IMC – how long participants flew
into IMC)

Relationship Between Preflight & Inflight Measures
•

Hypothesis 7 (H7): There will be a significant prediction of Decision Making by,
Percentage of crucial weather products accessed, Weather Phenomena, Weather
Trending, and Risk (see figure 6).
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Figure 6. Inflight Hypothesis Model H7

•

Hypothesis 8 (H8): There will be a significant prediction of Time Flown into IMC by,
Weather Phenomena, Weather Trending, Weather Change (see figure 7).
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Figure 7. Inflight Hypothesis Model H8

Mediation Model
•

Hypothesis 9 (H9). The impact of PWDST on Time Flown into IMC is effected by The
effect of PWDST on Preflight risk on Time Flown Into IMC (see figure 8).
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Figure 8. Inflight Hypothesis Model H9
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CHAPTER 2

METHODS
Experimental Design
The study will be a between subjects, 2 group design. The purpose of this study is to assess
the effect of a preflight decision support tool on novice pilots’ preflight and in turn, inflight
performance. The experimental group will receive the preflight decision support tool, whereas,
the control will not (see figure 9).

Preflight Decision Support Tool
Experimental
Control Group
Group

Figure 9. This figure is a pictorial representation of the experimental design.

Participants
Seventy-eight private pilots, 71 male and seven female with ages ranging from 18 to 30
(Mage = 20.15, SD = 2.56) without instrument ratings, were recruited from a Southeastern US
university. A total of 41 VFR private pilots were randomly assigned to the control group (no
preflight decision tool) and 37 VFR private pilots were assigned to the experimental group
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(preflight decision tool). This study was approved by the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Institutional Review board for participant protection and safety. For incentive, participants
received $100 for participation upon completion of the study.
Tables 3-5 contain more information about flight training, flight hours, and weather
experience.
Table 3.
Type of Flight Training Received

Type of Flight Training
Part 61
Part 141/ 142 Collegiate
Part 141/ 142 Non Collegiate
Military

n
34
7
36
1

The majority of pilots completed their training at a Part 141 flight non collegiate flight
program and a Part 61 fixed based operation training facility (FBO).
Table 4.
Mean and Median Total and Instrument Flight Hours

Condition
Control (No
PWDST)
Experimental
(PWDST)

n

Flight Hours
M (SD)
Median

Instrument Hours Actual
M (SD)
Median

41

99.96 (40.34)

97.00

2.19 (4.30)

0.30

36

98.40 (34.08)

92.5

1.78 (3.00)

0.55

Table 4 displays means and medians for total and instrument flight hours, as shown, both
groups have very limited instrument inflight experience.
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Table 5.
Count of Participants that Have Experienced VFR into IMC

Encountered Instrument
Meteorological Conditions
(IMC) while flying VFR?
Condition
Control (No PWDST)
Experimental
(PWDST)

No
29

Yes
12

23

14

Table 5 displays how many participants have encountered Instrument Meteorological
Conditions (IMC) while flying a VFR flight plan, both the control and experimental groups have
had limited VFR into IMC experience.
Table 6.
Mean Aviation Knowledge Score

Aviation Weather
Knowledge Score
Condition
Control (No
PWDST)
Experimental
(PWDST)

M (SD)
45.10 (6.79)
44.75 (6.81)

Table 6 depicts both the control and experimental groups’ aviation weather knowledge, both
groups scored relatively low, under 50 percent correct, on the Aviation Weather Knowledge
Exam.
Independent Variable Related Materials
The following materials were used in this study: Preflight decision support tool, Tool
Training Video, and Control Video.
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Preflight Weather Decision Support Tool. The Preflight Weather Decision Support Tool
was wire-framed using Google Drive App Draw.io and the high fidelity mockup was created
with AXURE software student license. The purpose of this tool is to guide users through the
preflight process and improve preflight and inflight performance. The Preflight Weather
Decision Support Tool (PWDST) is comprised of three main components; the preflight guide,
the personal minimums sections, and the risk assessment and checklist output.
The personal minimums section prompts users to set personal minimums for VFR flight. This
section is modeled from the FAA’s suggested personal minimum format and has ten items for
pilots to consider. For each item the pilot must identify their safety threshold. The PWDST
features suggested minimums ranges for each item, and alerts the user if their limit is outside the
suggested range. After completing all the fields successfully, the user will have a complete
record of their safe VFR minimums.
The preflight guide component guides the user through a set of weather products essential for
effective preflight planning. For each product the PWDST will have tips for product
interpretation and application, a form for note taking, and prompting decision-making questions.
The product interpretation assistance feature uses automation and usability principles to provide
legends and highlight key areas on weather products to simplify product interpretation.
After guiding the user through all the essential weather products, the user is brought to the
risk assessment and output section. This section summarizes the users notes gathered from the
accessed weather products. During this stage, the information is presented, and the tool helps the
user assign risk to reported weather phenomena. After assigning risk to the various weather
conditions along their flight route, the app helps the user decide whether to embark on the flight
or not.
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PWDST Training Video. This video took 30 minutes for participants to complete and it was
developed using Microsoft Video Maker. The purpose of the training video is to guide users
through the main components of the PWDST. The video illustrates how to navigate the tool’s
preflight guide, the personal minimums sections, and the risk assessment and checklist output.
Control Video. This video took participants 30 minutes to complete and was retrieved from
YouTube. The video reviews KAEL and KDTL airport information, including runway
information, airport facility information, and NOTAMS.
Experimental Task: Simulated flight scenario
Participants performed a preflight and inflight of one aviation weather scenario. The flight
scenario was a VFR into IMC scenario. In the scenario, the scheduled flight route started at the
departure airport, KAEL, MN, and ended at the destination airport, KDTL, MN. The flight was
estimated to last for 1 hour and 30 minutes. The aircraft used in this simulation was a Cessna 172
G100, on a VFR direct GPS flight route. Table 7 shows the flight times and description.
Table 7.
Flight Route.

VFR into IMC
Location:

KAEL, MN to KDTL, MN

Time:

Preflight

2200Z (5 PM CDT,
6 PM EDT)
2300Z (6 PM CDT,
Departure
7 PM EDT)
0045Z (7:30 PM
Destination
CDT, 8:30 PM EDT)
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Sky condition start clear with 10
statute miles visibility. Midway at
Description: KPEX conditions clouds drop to
overcast 800 ft, with thunderstorms in
the vicinity and fog.

Preflight. The purpose of this preflight was to closely mimic actual preflight processes.
Pilots were provided the flight information, including route, departure arrival times, NOTAMs,
additional airport information, and all weather information. Historical weather products were
collected from the Aviation Weather Website and the Pilot Training System website. A mock
Aviation Weather Center website was designed using AXURE software to present all the
weather needed for the preflight.
Weather products featured on the website include:
•

METARs

•

TAF

•

Surface Analysis Chart

•

Surface Prognostic Charts

•

Low Level Significant Weather

•

Convective SIGMET

•

G-AIRMET
o ZULU
o Freezing level
o Sierra
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o Tango
•

Satellite

•

Winds Aloft

•

PIREP

In addition to the weather information, pilots were also provided with Airport Diagrams,
ASOS and AWOS Frequencies, E6B Electronic Flight Calculator, Aeronautical Sectional Charts,
Chapter 5 of the Cessna 172 Aircraft Manual, and the ERAU Navigational Log Sheet to
complete the preflight scenario. Pilots were instructed to perform Preflight Planning tasks, as if
they were actually about to embark on the flight.
Inflight Simulation. The flight scenario was designed to present accurate yet changing
weather conditions. As displayed in Table 8, the weather conditions during the flight changed
somewhat from the weather forecasts and observations available to the pilot during pre-flight.
At the beginning of the simulated flight, pilots experienced VFR conditions and as the pilot
approached KAXN, weather conditions started to deteriorate with lowering clouds and decreased
visibility. When pilots reached KADC, weather conditions were IMC with thunderstorms and
rain in the area, and pilots were required to either divert or fly IFR operations. Once pilots
reached within 5 nautical miles of the destination, KDTL, the simulation ended.
Table 8.
Flight Route Weather Development

Airport Preflight METARs (AGL)

Preflight
Forecasted
Outlook (TAF)

KAEL
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Simulated WX (AGL)

KADC

METAR KAEL 142154Z

TAF KMKT

METAR KAEL 150055Z

AUTO 17007KT 10SM

141735Z

AUTO 15008KT 10SM

CLR 33/14 A2972 RMK

1418/1518

CLR 27/16 A2974 RMK

AO

18011KT P6SM AO2

METAR KADC 142152Z

FEW250

AUTO 12004KT 10SM

KDTL

FM150000

METAR KADC 150053Z
AUTO 01009KT 10SM

CLR 29/18 A2966 RMK

15008KT P6SM OVC009 21/19 A2972 RMK

AO2

SCT200

METAR KDTL 142154Z

FM150600

AO2 LTG DSNT N
METAR KDTL 150054Z

AUTO 02007KT 10SM

18010KT P6SM AUTO 02003KT 10SM

OVC011 22/18 A2971

BKN200

RMK AO2

FM151500

VCTS OVC008 19/17
A2976 RMK AO2 LTG

19009KT P6SM DSNT N AND NE
SCT250

Flight Simulator. The desktop flight simulation was implemented with PREPAR3D, version 3
(Lockheed Martin, 2017). The Active Sky (Active Sky 2016, Version 3) add-on weather was
used to depict high fidelity weather within the PREPAR3D simulation environment.
Dependent Variables/Measures
For the purpose of this study, performance was defined in terms of risk assessment,
weather interpretation/application, information acquisition, and decision-making. A combination
of observation tools and surveys were used to measure these constructs in both preflight and
inflight portions of the scenario.
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Survey Measures. All surveys were developed online using the Qualtrics survey
software. The participant background surveys (see below) were provided online, and participants
completed online surveys on their device of choice.
All the measures were separated into three primary groups Background Surveys, Preflight
Surveys, and Inflight Surveys. Table 9 displays survey measure and cronbach alphas.
Table 9.
Scales Means & Reliability

Scale
Post Preflight Survey
Preflight Weather
Phenomena
Preflight Weather Trending
Preflight Risk
Post Inflight Survey
Inflight Weather
Phenomena
Inflight Weather Trending

Item Number

Cronbach's
α

M (SD)

8

0.71

85.6 (18.9)

6
3

0.88
0.81

49.1 (39.3)
35.5 (40.7)

6

0.73

62.6 (30.4)

2

0.83

87.8 (30.4)

The purpose of the participant background surveys was to get a baseline measurement of
participants’ flight experience, weather experience, product familiarity, confidence in knowledge
of weather skills and principles, and risk assessment abilities. These include the following five
surveys:
Demographic Survey. The demographic survey was composed of 85 items. The demographic
survey items covered topics such as participant age, flight training, flight experience, weather
training, and weather experience (see Appendix A).
Product Usage Questionnaire. The product usage questionnaire was comprised of 105 items
(see Appendix B). The survey identified which weather products (i.e., observations and forecasts)
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participants use the most often and how much participants value various weather products and
weather product source information. First, participants were prompted to rate how valuable
information is from each product and product source on a five point likert scale. Then participants
were prompted to indicate which products/products sources they rely on for the most up to date
weather information during preflight and while inflight.
Self-Efficacy. The self-efficacy questionnaire contained 105 items (see Appendix C). The
survey focused on participant’s confidence in their knowledge, skills, and ability to access,
interpret, and apply aviation weather information. For each item, participants were asked to rate
their confidence on a scale from “0 Cannot do at all”, to “Highly certain I can do”.
Weather Knowledge. The weather knowledge assessment consisted of 45 multiple choice
items, the topics covered include weather products interpretation, knowledge of product
limitations, and ability to apply weather information. The questions are an adaption of the
weather knowledge assessment developed by Blickensderfer et. al., (2017).
Preflight Survey. This survey measured risk assessment, weather interpretation/application,
and decision-making after the pilot had completed the preflight and was ready to fly the
simulation (see Appendix D). This survey prompted participants to predict how weather will
develop and describe weather at the destination, en-route, and departure airport. Participants
were also asked how risky the reported weather conditions is and their confidence in their risk
assessment. Lastly, participants were asked about their decision to fly the flight route and
whether they planned a diversion route and airport.
Tool Training Quiz. This quiz tested participants’ ability to navigate the PWDST as well as
their perceived usability of the tool.
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Control Training Quiz. This quiz tested participants on their knowledge of the information
presented in the Control Video, including KAEL and KDTL airport information, runway
information, airport facility information, and NOTAMS.
Inflight Survey. The post-scenario weather situation assessment survey was a retrospective
survey (completed after flying the simulation) and measured participant risk assessment, weather
interpretation/application, and decision-making regarding the inflight portion of the scenario (see
Appendix E). This survey prompted participants to report decisions made during the inflight
simulation and to describe weather observed during the inflight simulation at the destination, enroute, and departure airport. Participants were also asked to rate how risky their decisions were
inflight, asked how risky the inflight weather conditions were, and their confidence in their risk
assessment. Lastly, participants were asked about their decisions to get inflight weather, their
flight path, and whether or not they decided to divert or not.
Observational Measures
Behavioral measures were used to assess performance for the preflight and inflight
portions of the scenario.
Preflight Observational Measures. In order to measure information acquisition, the Ice
Cream screen recoding tool was used to record information acquisition frequency and accuracy
during the preflight scenario.
Inflight Observational Measures. Ice Cream screen recording tool was used to record the flight
to later obtain the following inflight measures:
•

Total Flight Time in IMC: This represents the total time during the inflight
simulation acenario that participants flew in IMC.
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•

PIREPs of Weather Change: Participants identified and reported when weather
changes significantly during the inflight simulation scenario.

Tables 10 and 11 display a summary of the survey and observational measures for preflight and
inflight, respectively.

Table 10.
Preflight Measures

Preflight Scenario Measures
Construct

Observation

Tool
Ice Cream

Weather Product

Weather Information
Screen

Knowledge/ Limitations

Frequency
Recording

Construct

Survey

Tool

Preflight Survey

Qualtrics

Weather Awareness,
Risk, Decision making

Table 11.
Inflight Measures

Inflight Simulation Scenario Measures
Construct

Observation
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Tool

PIREP Reporting of current
Weather Awareness

Voice Recorder
weather conditions
Time spent flying into

Ice Cream Screen

hazardous weather

Recording

Construct

Survey

Tool

Risk, Weather Awareness

Inflight Survey

Qualtrics

Decision Making

Procedure
Once participants arrived at the data collection site they were briefed. Each participant
reviewed and signed an informed consent from. Then participants received an email with a link
to all the background surveys, and participants completed all the surveys at home on the device
of their choice. After completing the background surveys, the participants were scheduled for an
appointment to complete the preflight and flight scenario. When participants arrived at their
appointment they will again be briefed about the study. Next, participants completed the
Aviation Weather Knowledge Exam. Then, the control group was given a 20-minute aviation
video to watch. Whereas, the experimental group was trained on how to use the Preflight
Decision Support Tool. After the training, the experimental group took a proficiency quiz and a
usability assessment on the PWDST. After the control video, the control group took a quiz on
the information in the aviation video. Afterwards, all participants completed the preflight
scenario followed by the preflight survey. Then, all participants completed the inflight simulation
followed by the inflight survey. Finally, each participant was debriefed and given their
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compensation. See Table 12 for estimated completion times. At the completion of the study,
participants were debriefed and compensated $100.00.

Table 12.
Procedures

Procedure
Phases

Time

Control Group

Experimental

Phase 1

10 minutes

Brief

2 minutes

Consent Form

15 minutes

Demographics

10 minutes

Self-Efficacy

20 minutes

Product Frequency of Use

Total: 57
minutes

Phase 2

40 minutes

Weather Knowledge Assessment

20 minutes

Tool Training

Aviation Video

10 minutes

Tool Training Quiz

Aviation Video Quiz

1 hour

Preflight Scenario

15 minutes

Post Preflight Survey

1 hour

Inflight Simulation Scenario
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15 minutes

Post Inflight Survey

10 minutes

Debrief & Compensation

Total: 3 hours
50 minutes
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS

Preflight Hypotheses Analyses
The first analysis assessed the Preflight Hypotheses one, two, and three.
A one-way, between subjects MANOVA was run to investigate the experimental and control
group differences in preflight performance variables. Four dependent variables were included:
Percent of Key Products Accessed, Preflight Weather Phenomena, Preflight Weather Trending,
Preflight Risk. The independent variable is the PWDST. Tables 13 and 14 display the
intercorrelations and descriptive statistics.
Table 13.
Correlations for Preflight Variables

Variable
1 Preflight Weather Phenomena
2 Preflight Weather Trend
3 Preflight Risk
4

Preflight Percent of Key
Products Accessed

5 PWDST a
a

n
78
78
78

M
SD
85.58 18.91
49.15 39.28
35.47 40.68

1
--0.18
0.10

2

3

--0.55**

---

78

58.62 39.95

0.26*

0.22*

0.27*

78

0.47

0.30**

0.20

0.27* 0.91**

0.50

4

5

-----

0 = Control Group (No PWDST) and 1= Experimental Group (PWDST). *p < .05 **p < .01

Table 14.
Mean Scores for PWDST on Preflight Dependent Variables

Variables
Preflight Weather Phenomena
Preflight Weather Trend

Control Group
M
SD
80.95
21.95
43.25
39.83
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Experimental Group
M
SD
90.97
12.89
56.02
38.04

Total
M
85.58
49.15

SD
18.91
39.28

Preflight Risk
Percent of Key Products
Accessed

26.98

36.99

45.37

43.02

35.47

40.68

27.71

26.41

94.70

14.48

58.62

39.95

The results of preliminary assumption testing were as follows:
•

Outliers. Boxplots and Mahalanobis Distances were conducted revealing 12 univariate
outliers and one multivariate outlier in the data set. Both univariate and multivariate
outliers were not removed for this analysis.

•

Normality. A Shapiro-Wilk's test for normality indicated all dependent variables
(Percent of Key Products Accessed, Weather Phenomena, Weather trending, and Risk
scores) were not normally distributed for both levels of the independent variable,
PWDST (p < .001).

•

Multicollinearity & Singularity. A Pearsons Correlation indicated there was no
multicollinearity found amongst the dependent variables (see Table 13).

•

Linearity. Scatterplots were developed to investigate linearity, and indicated that there
were no linear relationships between the DVs .

•

Homogeneity of Variance-Covariances. A Box's test of equality of covariance matrices
was conducted to evaluate homogeneity of variance-covariances matrices, the assumption
of homogeneity of variance-covariances was violated (p < .001).

•

Homogeneity. The Levene's Test of Homogeneity of Variance revealed the assumption
of homogeneity of variances was also violated (p < .001).
Due to the violation of the assumption of homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices,

Pillai’s Trace criterion was used instead of Wilks’ lambda to evaluate multivariate significance
(Olson, 1979; Tabachnick & Fidel, 2013, p. 254). The omnibus multivariate test results
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indicated, that there was a statistical significant main affect of the PWDST on the combined
DVs, F(4, 73) = 89.43, p =.000; Pillai’s Trace = .831; partial η = .831.
2

Mean Scores

The Main Effect of PWDST on Preflight Performance
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Control
Experimental

Weather Phenomena

Weather Trend

Risk

Dependent Variables

Percent of Key Products
Accessed

Figure 10. Effect of PWDST on Preflight Performance

As a result of the assumption of equality of variances being violated for Preflight
Weather Phenomena, Preflight Risk, and Percent of Key Products Accessed, a more conservative
alpha level of .0125 was used for determining significance in the follow-up univariate F-test.
When the results for the DVs were considered separately with univariate ANOVAs, there was a
statistical significant main effect of the PWDST on Preflight Weather Phenomena Score ( F [1,
76] = 356.12, p =.007, partial η2 = .09) and Percent of Key Products Accessed (F [1, 76] =
356.12, p = .000, partial η2 = .82). Additionally, results indicated there was not a statistically
significant main effect of the PWDST on Preflight Risk (F [1, 76] = 356.12, p = .018, partial η2
= .072) and Weather Trend (F [1, 76] = 356.12, p = .085, partial η2 = .038). Bonferroni Post Hoc
tests revealed that participants that used the PWDST scored significantly higher on Preflight
Weather Phenomena (M= 80.18, SD = 21.83, p =0.007) and accessed a statistically significant

87

higher Percent of Key Weather Products (M= 96.56, SD = 10.35, p < .001. There were no other
significant findings (see figure 10).
As a result, there is partial support of the preflight hypotheses (H1, H2a, H2b, H3). We
accept the alternate hypothesis one and hypothesis 2(A) but do not reject the null hypothesis 2(B)
or null hypothesis three.
Table 15.
Hypotheses Testing: One, Two, and Three

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 1

Hypotheses

Null /
Alternate

Description

H10

PWDST has no effect on Percent of
Key Products Accessed during preflight
planning

H1a

PWDST has a positive effect on
Percent of Key Products Accessed
during preflight planning.

H2A0

PWDST has no effect on Preflight
Subcategory Weather Phenomena
Score.

H2Aa

PWDST has a positive effect on
Preflight Subcategory Weather
Phenomena Score.

H2B0

Hypothesis 3

H2Ba

PWDST has no effect on Preflight
Subcategory Weather Trending score.
PWDST has a positive effect on
Preflight Subcategory Weather
Trending Score.

H30

PWDST has no effect on Preflight Risk
Perception.

H3a

PWDST has a positive effect on
Preflight Risk Perception.
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Accept

Do not
Reject

X

X
X

X

Next, a logistic regression was run to assess the degree to which the four preflight measures
(Percent of Key Products Accessed, Preflight Weather phenomena, Preflight Weather trending,
and Preflight Risk) predicted Preflight Decision Making. This was used to test Hypothesis seven.
Tables 16 and 17 display the intercorrelations and descriptive statistics.
Table 16.
Correlations for Preflight Variables including Go or No-Go Decision

1
2
3
4
5
a

Variable
Preflight Weather Phenomena
Preflight Weather Trend
Preflight Risk
Preflight Percent of Key
Preflight Products Accessed
Go or No Go decision a

n
M
78 85.58
78 49.15
78 35.47

SD
18.91
39.28
40.68

1
--0.18
0.10

2

3

--0.55**

---

78 58.62

39.95

0.26*

0.22*

0.27*

---

78

0.50

0.071

-0.31**

-0.64**

-0.18

0.47

4

0 = No Go and 1 = Go *p < .05 **p < .01

Table 17.
Descriptive Statistics & T-Test results for Preflight including Go or No-go Decision

Variable
Weather Phenomena
Weather Trend
Risk
Percent of Key
Products

Not
Going
VFR
Flight
Plan
83.98
63.54
66.67
67.05

Going
On VFR
Flight
Plan

t (138)

p

86.68
39.13
13.77

-0.62
2.82
6.87

0.538
0.006
0.000

52.77

1.57

0.121

The results of preliminary assumption testing was as follows:
•

Linearity. Linearity of the continuous variables with respect to the logit of the dependent
variable was assessed using the Box-Tidwell (1962) procedure. A Bonferroni correction
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5

---

was applied, resulting in a more conservative alpha level, p < .00625 (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2014). Based on this assessment, all continuous independent variables were found
to be linearly related to the logit of the dependent variable, except for Preflight Risk, p <
.00625 .
•

Multicollinearity & Singularity. A Pearsons Correlation indicated there was no
multicollinearity found amongst the dependent variables (see table 16).

•

Outliers. There were two standardized residuals with values of 3.613 and -3.023 standard
deviations, these cases were kept in the analysis.

Table 18.
Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Go or No Do on Preflight Performance Variables

95% CI for Odds
Ratio
Variable
Preflight Weather
Phenomena
Preflight Weather
Trend
Preflight Risk
Percent of Key
Products

B

SE

Wald

df

p

Odds
Ratio

Lower

Upper

0.022

0.16

1.98

1

0.159

1.022

0.991

1.055

0.003

0.009

0.117

1

0.732

1.003

0.985

1.022

-0.044

0.011

17.708

1

0.00

0.957

0.937

0.97

-0.003

0.008

0.162

1

0.687

0.997

9.87

1.013

A direct logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of Percent of Key
Products Accessed, Weather phenomena, Weather trending, and Risk on the likelihood that
respondents would decide to embark on the prompted VFR flight plan or not. The full model
containing all four predictors was statistically significant, χ2 (4, N = 78) = 37.90, p = .000,
indicating that the model was able to distinguish between respondents who decided to embark on
the prompted VFR flight plan or not. The model as a whole explained between 38.5% (Cox and
Snell R square) and 51.9% (Nagelkerke R squared) of the variance in Preflight Decision Making,
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and correctly classified 80.8% of cases. As shown in Table 18, “Preflight Risk” was the only
variable that made a unique, statistically significant contribution to the model, recording an odds
ratio of .96. This indicates that respondents who scored lower on Preflight Risk (i.e., perceived
the flight as low risk regarding weather) were .96 times more likely to decide to embark on the
prompted VFR flight plan, controlling for other factors in the model.
These results provide partial support of Hypothesis 7. We accept the alternate hypothesis
for Preflight Risk, but do not reject the null Hypothesis 7 for Percent of Key Products Accessed,
Preflight Weather Phenomena, or Preflight Weather Trending.

Table 19.
Hypothesis Testing: Seven

Null /
Alternate

Description

H70

There is not a significant prediction of
Decision Making by Percentage of
crucial weather products accessed,
Preflight Weather Phenomena, Preflight
Weather Trending, and Preflight Risk.

H7a

There is a significant prediction of
Decision Making by Percentage of
crucial weather products accessed,
Preflight Weather Phenomena, Preflight
Weather Trending, and Preflight Risk.

Hypothesis 7

Hypotheses

Accept

Do not
Reject

X

Inflight Hypotheses Analyses
Next, a one-way, between groups MANOVA was run to investigate the experimental and
control group differences on inflight performance variables (Hypotheses five and six). Three
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dependent variables were included: Inflight Weather Phenomena, Inflight Weather Trending, and
Total Time in IMC. The independent variable was the PWDST. The descriptive statistics and
intercorrelation matrix for the inflight variables are shown in Table 20 and 21.
Table 20.
Correlations for Inflight Variables

Variable
Inflight Weather Phenomena
Inflight Weather Trend
Inflight Total Time in IMC
PWDST a

1
2
3
4
a

n
78
78
78
78

M
SD
62.61 30.41
87.82 30.35
285.64 447.1
0.47
0.5

1
--0.37**
0.10
-0.113

2

3

4

--0.32**
0.001

---0.13

---

0 = Control Group (No PWDST) and 1= Experimental Group (PWDST). *p < .05 **p < .01

Table 21.
Descriptive Statistics Inflight Variables and Experimental Condition

Control Group
n = 42
Variable
Inflight Weather
Phenomena
Inflight Weather
Trend
Total Time in IMC

Experimental
Group
n = 36
M
SD

M

SD

65.85

29.33

59.01

87.8

31.19

340.50

495.73

Total
n = 78
M

SD

31.57

62.61

30.41

87.84

29.83

87.82

30.35

224.85

383.88

285.64

447.14

The results of preliminary assumption testing were as follows:
•

Outliers. Boxplots and Mahalanobis Distances were conducted revealing 17 univariate
outliers and no multivariate outliers. The univariate outliers were not removed for this
analysis.
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•

Normality. A Shapiro-Wilk's test for normality indicated all dependent variables:
Weather Phenomena, Weather Trending, and Total Time in IMC were not normally
distributed for both levels of the independent variable, PWDST (p < .05).

•

Multicollinearity & Singularity. A Pearsons Correlation indicated there was no
multicollinearity found amongst the dependent variables (see table 20).

•

Linearity. Scatterplots were developed to investigate linearity, results indicated there
was no linear relationship between the DVs.

•

Homogeneity of Variance-Covariances. A Box's test of equality of covariance matrices
was conducted to evaluate homogeneity of variance-covariances matrices, the assumption
of homogeneity of variance-covariances was satisfied (p = .647).
The omnibus multivariate test results indicated, there was not a statistical significant

main effect of PWDST on the combined DVs, F(3, 74) = .622, p = .603; Pillai’s Trace = .025;
partial η = .025.
2

Mean Scores

The Effect of PWDST on Inflight Performance
Control

340
320
300
280
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

Experimental

Weather Phenomena

Weather Trend

Dependent Variables

Figure 11. Effect of PWDST on Inflight Performance
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Total time imc

Table 22.
Hypotheses Testing: Five and Six

Hypothesis 6

Hypothesis 5

Hypotheses

Null /
Alternate

Description

H5A0

PWDST does not have an effect on
Inflight Subcategory Weather
Phenomena score.

H5Aa

PWDST has a positive effect on Inflight
Subcategory Weather Phenomena
Score.

H5B0

PWDST does not have an effect on
Inflight Subcategory Weather Trending
score .

H5Ba

PWDST has a positive effect on Inflight
Subcategory Weather Trending Score.

H60

PWDST does not have an effect on
Total Time in IMC.

H6a

PWDST has a negative effect on Total
Time in IMC.

Accept

Do not
Reject
X

X

X

Next, a multiple regression was used to assess the ability of three measures (Inflight Weather
phenomena, Inflight Weather trending, and Inflight Weather Change) to predict Total Time in
IMC, assessing Inflight performance (hypothesis nine). Tables 23 and 24 display the
intercorrelations, descriptive statistics, and regression results.
Table 23.
Intercorrelations for Inflight Variables

Variable
1 Inflight Weather Phenomena
2 Inflight Weather Trend
3 Inflight Weather Change a

n
M
SD
78 62.61 30.41
78 87.82 30.35
78 0.69 0.46
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1
--0.37**
0.11

2

3

--0.03

---

4

4 Total Time in IMC
a

78

0.59

0.5

0.32**

0.10

-0.07

0 = Did Not Report PIREP At Weather Change and 1= Reported PIREP At Weather Change. *p < .05 **p < .01

The results of preliminary assumption testing were as follows:
•

Independence of Observations. The Durbin-Watson statistic was calculated to assess
independence of residuals, results indicated there was not an independence of residuals,
.617.

•

Linearity. Partial regression plots and a plot of studentized residuals against the
predicted values were developed to ensure approximate linearity.

•

Homoscedasticity. Visual inspection of a plot of studentized residuals versus
unstandardized predicted values, indicated the assumption of homoscedacity was
violated.

•

Multicollinearity. Tolerance values were assessed and the assumption of
multicollinearity was satisfied, since both tolerance values greater than 0.1.

•

Outliers, High leverage points, and Highly influential points. There were no
studentized deleted residuals greater than ±3 standard deviations, no leverage values
greater than 0.2, and values for Cook's distance above 1.

•

Normality. A Q-Q Plot was generated to assess the assumption of normality, this
assumption was violated.

A standard multiple regression was used to assess the ability of three measures (Inflight
Weather trending, Inflight Weather Phenomena, and Inflight Weather Change,) to predict Total
Time in IMC. The multiple regression model significantly predicted Total Time in IMC, the total
variance explained by the model as a whole was 10.0%, F (3, 74) = 2.729, p =.05. Only Inflight
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Weather Phenomena was statistically significant (beta = 4.72, p = .008). Regression coefficients
and standard errors can be found in Table 24 (below).
Table 24.
Regression Analysis Summary for Inflight Performance Variables Predicting Inflight Decision Making

Variable
Inflight Weather Phenomena
Inflight Weather Trend
Inflight Weather Change

B
4.72
-0.30
16.92

SE B
1.74
1.78
108.18

β
0.32
-0.02
0.02

t
1
1
1

p
0.008
0.866
0.88

These results provide partial support of Hypothesis 8, and we accept the alternate hypothesis
for the variable Inflight Weather Phenomena, but we do not reject the null Hypothesis 8 for the
variables Inflight Weather Trending or Inflight Weather Change.
Table 25.
Hypotheses Testing: Eight

Hypothesis 8

Hypotheses

Null /
Alternate
H80

H8a

Description
There is not a significant prediction of
Time Flown into IMC by Inflight
Weather Phenomena, Inflight
Weather Trending, Inflight Weather
Change.
There is a significant prediction of
Time Flown into IMC by Inflight
Weather Phenomena, Inflight
Weather Trending, Inflight Weather
Change.

Accept

Do not
Reject

X

A series of regression analyses (Hayes, 2013) was used to investigate the hypothesis that
Preflight Risk mediates the effect of PWDST on Time Flown Intro IMC. The total effect of the
manipulation on Time Spent in IMC was significant c = -279.785, t(121) = -3.0492 p = 0.0033.
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With 95% confidence, Tc resides somewhere between −462.834 and -96.736. The direct effect
is also statistically different from zero, c′ = -273.931, t(120) = -2.840 p = .0060. The null
hypothesis that T c′ = 0 can be rejected. The interval estimate for T c′ is -466.441 to -81.422
with 95% confidence. However, indirect effect was tested using bootstrapping procedures
(Hayes, 2013) with 5,000 bootstrapped samples. The bootstrapped 95% confidence interval
ranged from -76.1089 to 52.8233. Thus, the indirect effect was not statistically significant and
mediation did not have an effect.

Figure 12. Preflight Risk as a mediator between the effect of PWDST on Time Flown Intro IMC

These results do not support Hypothesis 9, and we do not reject the null hypothesis 9.
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Table 26.
Hypotheses Testing: Ten

Hypothesis 9

Hypotheses

Null /
Alternate

Description

H90

The impact of PWDST on Time Flown
Into IMC is not effected by Preflight
risk.

H9a

There is a significant prediction of Time
Flown into IMC by, Weather
Phenomena, Weather Trending,
Weather Change.

Accept

Do not
Reject
X

Exploratory Analyses
The analyses reported in this section were not included in the original set of analyses.
These analyses were conducted to further investigate possible effects, relationships, hypotheses,
and results.
Investigation of Preflight and Inflight Performance Variable Relationships. In order to
understand preflight and inflight variable relationships an intercorrelation matrix was conducted.
Results indicated very small insignificant relationships between Inflight and Preflight Variables
(see Table 27).
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Table 27.

n
78
78
78
58.62

M
85.58
49.15
35.47

0.50

39.95

SD
18.91
39.28
40.68

0.07

0.30**

0.26*

1
--0.18
0.10

-0.31**

0.20

0.22*

--0.55**

2

0.03
0.02
-0.06
-0.10

-0.64**

0.27*

0.27*

---

3

-0.13
0.03
-0.06
-0.16

-0.18

0.91**

---

-0.11
0.00
-0.05
-0.13

-0.20

---

Correlations for Preflight and Inflight Performance Variables

78
0.47
0.50

-0.01
0.14
0.08
-0.22

5

78
0.59

-0.15
-0.18
0.08
-0.14

4

PWDST a
78
62.61 30.41
87.82 30.35
0.69
0.46
285.6 447.14

1
2
3

5
Preflight Go or No GO on VFR
Flight b
78
78
78
78

Variable
Preflight Weather Phenomena
Preflight Weather Trend
Preflight Risk
Preflight Percent of Key
Products Accessed

6
Inflight Weather Phenomena
Inflight Weather Trend
Inflight Weather Change c
Inflight Total Time in IMC

4

7
8
9
10

6

---

7

0.11
0.32**

--0.09
-0.03 0.37**

0.05
0.15

0.10

--0.03

8

-0.07

---

9

10

---

a
0 = Control Group (No PWDST) and 1= Experimental Group (PWDST). b 0 = No Go and 1 = Go *p < .05 **p < .01. c 0 = Did Not Reported Pirep At
Weather Change and 1= Report Pirep At Weather Change.
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Retest of Hypotheses Four. Initially, the Preflight MANOVA was intended to assess the
effect of the PWDST on all preflight measures (Preflight Percent of Key Products Accessed,
Preflight Weather Phenomena, Preflight Weather Trending, Preflight Risk, and Preflight
Decision Making). However, during data processing, the preflight decision-making construct
resulted in dichotomous data (GO or No Go decision) instead of a continuous variable.
Therefore, the decision-making variable was unable to be included in the MANOVA analysis,
and instead the difference in conditions groups responses in Preflight Decision Making (GO or
No GO) was assessed using the Test of Two Proportions (i.e., a chi-square analysis).
The results of preliminary assumption testing was as follows:
•

Dichotomous Variables: One Independent Variable and One Dependent Variable.
This assumption was satisfied.

•

Independence of Observations. The assumption of independence of observations was
satisfied.

•

Randomly Assigned Groups. The assumption of randomly assigned groups was
satisfied.

•

Sample Size. The minimum expected frequency in any of the cells is 15.20, which
is greater than 5. Therefore, the assumption of adequate sample size was satisfied.

The test of two proportions used was the chi-square test of homogeneity in order to compare
differences in proportions for the PWDST condition (control group and experimental group) and
preflight Decision Making (Go or No Go). Results indicated that 19 (51.4%) participants in the
experimental group decided not to Go on the proposed VFR flight plan compared to 13 (31.7%)

participants in the control group (34%), indicating a difference in proportions of .19, that is not
significant p = .078 (see Table 28).
Table 28.
Preflight Test of Proportions Results

Go or No Go Decision
No
Condition
Control Group
Experimental Group

Count
13
19

Yes
Percent
31.70%
51.40%

Count
28
18

Percent
68.30%
48.60%

As a result, there is no support of the preflight hypothesis 4 and we do not reject the null
hypothesis (see Table 29).
Table 29.
Hypothesis Testing: Four

Hypothesis 4

Hypotheses

Null /
Alternate

Description

H40

Participants in the experimental group
will not differ in their decision to Go or
Not Go

H4a

More participants in the experimental
group will Decide to Not Go than
participants in the control group

Accept

Do not
Reject
X

Additional Analyses Investigating Decision Making. Results of the Test of Two
Proportions revealed there was not a significant difference between Condition groups’ decision
to fly. However, previous research indicates that decision-making may be affected by various
factors other than weather and flight information, such as, social biases, risk tolerance, and the
ability to plan an alternate airport and route changes. Another inspection of participant responses
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revealed that the majority of experimental group participants reported, planning an alternate or
planning to turn around as a reason for deciding to fly to fly the proposed VFR flight plan.
Next, to gain more insight on participant responses regarding prefight decision-making,
another Test of Two Proportions was run to assess group differences in the response to the
following statement on the Post Preflight Survey, “Based on the provided information this flight
should be safe to fly VFR and land at the proposed destination airport.”
The results of preliminary assumption testing was as follows:
•

Dichotomous Variables: One Independent Variable and One Dependent Variable.
This assumption was satisfied.

•

Independence of Observations. The assumption of independence of observations was
satisfied.

•

Randomly Assigned Groups. The assumption of randomly assigned groups was
satisfied.

•

Sample Size. The minimum expected frequency in any of the cells is 13.10, which
is greater than 5. Therefore, the assumption of adequate sample size was satisfied

The test of two proportions used was the chi-square test of homogeneity in order to compare
differences in proportions for the PWDST condition (control group and experimental group) on
responses to whether the VFR flight plan was safe for the flight to the destination airport. Results
indicated that 17 (45.90%) participants in the experimental group disagreed that the flight was
safe to fly VFR and land at the destination airport compared to eight (19.50%) participants in the
control group. This was a statistically significant difference in proportions of .26, p = .012.
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The next analysis assessed the difference in condition groups’ responses to the following
statement on the Post Preflight Survey, “This flight could be risky due to weather conditions.”
Table 30.
Preflight Decision Making Test of Proportions Results: Whether it is Safe To Fly VFR Flight

Safe To Fly VFR Flight
Incorrect
Condition
Control Group
Experimental Group

Correct

Count

Percent

Count

Percent

33
20

80.50%
54.10%

8
17

19.50%
45.90%

The results of preliminary assumption testing was as follows:
•

Dichotomous Variables: One Independent Variable and One Dependent Variable.
This assumption was satisfied.

•

Independence of Observations. The assumption of independence of observations was
satisfied.

•

Randomly Assigned Groups. The assumption of randomly assigned groups was
satisfied.

•

Sample Size. The minimum expected frequency in any of the cells is 12.60, which
is greater than 5. Therefore, the assumption of adequate sample size was satisfied

To compare differences for condition (control group and experimental group) on responses
on another item on the Preflight Decision Making Test, “Riskiness of Flight Due to Weather”,
another test of two proportions (the chi-square test of homogeneity) was used. Results indicated
that 18 (48.60%) participants in the experimental group agreed that the flight the flight could be
risky due to weather conditions, compared to six (14.60%) participants in the control group. This
was a statistically significant difference in proportions of .34, p = .001 (See Table 31).
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Table 31.
Preflight Decision Making Test of Proportions Results: Riskiness of Flight Due to Weather

Condition
Control Group
Experimental Group

Riskiness of Flight Due to Weather
Incorrect
Correct
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
35
85.40%
6
14.60%
19
51.40%
18
48.60%

Retest of Hypotheses Five, Six, and Seven. The initial/hypothesized Inflight MANOVA
was intended to assess the effect of the PWDST on all Inflight measures (Inflight Weather
Phenomena, Inflight Weather Trending, Inflight Risk, and Total Time in IMC). However, the
data failed the majority of assumptions for the MANOVA analysis, and thus, these results were
somewhat inconclusive. Therefore, as additional exploratory analyses, the differences between
conditions on each inflight dependent variable were examined using a series of T-tests. For these
T-tests, an adjusted alpha level of 0.0167 was necessary in order to avoid type 1 errors.
PWDST Effect on Inflight Weather Phenomena
An Independent Samples T-test was run to assess the difference between condition group
responses on Inflight Weather Phenomena.
The results of preliminary assumption testing were as follows:
•

Outliers. Boxplots developed and revealed there were no outliers.

•

Normality. A Shapiro-Wilk's test for normality indicated Inflight Weather Phenomena
was not normally distributed for both levels of the independent variable, PWDST (p <
.05).
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•

Homogeneity of Variance-Covariances. Levene’s test for equality of covariance
matrices was conducted to evaluate homogeneity of variances, the assumption of
homogeneity of variances was satisfied (p = .685).
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the Inflight Weather

Phenomena scores for the experimental and control group. There was no significant
difference in scores for the control group (M = 65.85, SD = 29.33) and the experimental
group (M = 59.01, SD = 31.57; t (76) = .099, p = .324, two-tailed). The magnitude of the
differences in the means (mean difference = 6.84, 95% CI: –6.89 to 20.58) was very small
(eta squared = .224).
Table 32.
PWDST on Inflight Weather Phenomena T-Test Results

Variable
Inflight Weather
Phenomena

Control
n = 41
M
SD
65.85

29.33

Experimental
n = 37
M
SD

t(76)

p

Cohen's d

59.01

0.99

0.324

0.224

31.57

PWDST Effect on Inflight Weather Trending
A Independent Samples T-test was run to assess the difference between condition group
responses on Inflight Weather Trending.
•

Outliers. Boxplots developed and revealed there were 10 outliers, all outliers were
removed.

•

Normality. A Shapiro-Wilk's test for normality indicated Inflight Weather Trending was
not normally distributed for both levels of the independent variable, PWDST (p < .05).
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•

Homogeneity of Variance-Covariances. Levene’s test for equality of covariance
matrices was conducted to evaluate homogeneity of variances, the assumption of
homogeneity of variances was satisfied (p = .868).

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the Inflight Weather Trending
scores for the experimental and control group. There was no significant difference in scores for
the control group (M = 97.22, SD = 16.67) and the experimental group (M = 96.88, SD = 17.68;
t (66) = .083, p = .934, two-tailed). The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean
difference = .35, 95% CI: –7.97 to 8.67) was very small (eta squared = .002).

Table 33.
PWDST on Inflight Weather Trend T-Test Results

Variable
Inflight Weather Trend

Control
n = 36
M
SD
97.22 16.67

Experimental
n = 32
M
SD
96.88 17.68

t(66)
0.08

p
0.93

Cohen's d
0.002

PWDST Effect on Total Time in IMC
An Independent Samples T-test was run to assess the difference between condition group
responses on Total Time in IMC.
•

Outliers. Boxplots developed and revealed there were 7 outliers, all outliers were
removed.

•

Normality. A Shapiro-Wilk's test for normality indicated Inflight Weather Trending was
not normally distributed for both levels of the independent variable, PWDST (p < .05).
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•

Homogeneity of Variance-Covariances. Levene’s test for equality of covariance
matrices was conducted to evaluate homogeneity of variances, the assumption of
homogeneity of variances was violated (p = .000).

Since the assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, A Welch’s t-test was
conducted to compare the Total Time in IMC scores for the experimental and control group.
Results indicate, there was statistically significant difference in scores for the control group
(M = 340.50, SD = 495.73) and the experimental group (M = 60.71, SD = 89.83; t (69) = 3.05, p
= .001, two-tailed). The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean difference = 279.79,
95% CI: 120.25 to 439.32) was medium size effect (eta squared = .785).
Table 34.
PWDST on Total Time in IMC T-Test Results

Variable
Inflight Weather
Phenomena

Control
n = 41
M
SD
340.5

495.73
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Experimental
n = 30
M
SD

t(69)

p

Cohen's d

60.71

3.05

0.001

0.785

89.83

CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION

Figure 13. Dissertation Theoretical Model

PWDST Effect on Preflight Performance
Hypothesized Results
The PWDST was designed to assist pilots with accessing, interpreting and applying
weather products during weather preflight planning. Therefore, Hypotheses One, Two, and Three
proposed that the PWDST would increase information acquisition (i.e., the number of key
weather products pilots accessed during preflight weather planning) (H1) and, in turn, how
accurately participants were able to report weather phenomena (H2A), weather trending (H2B),
and overall weather risk for the proposed flight route (H3). These predictions were based on
previous research citing preflight weather planning as a critical component in the development of
pilots’ mental model of developing and present weather along their flight route (Lanicci et al.,
2012), as well as the efficacy of performance support tools in other domains (Barness,

108

Tunnessen, Worely, Simmons, & Ringe,1974; Miller, Chanllinor, Masarie, & Myers, 1986). (see
Figure 14).

Figure 14. Effect of PWDST on Preflight Performance Hypotheses

These hypotheses were partially supported. Results indicated that the PWDST had a
significant effect on the percentage of key weather products that the pilots accessed during
preflight, as well as how accurately participants were able to report the forecasted weather
phenomena for their flight route. Although results indicated there was only a small correlation
between percent of key products accessed and preflight weather phenomena, these results
support previous research suggesting that the perceive (information acquisition), process
(information assessment), and preform (information application) stages of preflight are
sequential steps that are dependent upon each other (Parson et al., 2005). Participants in the
PWDST condition received guidance from the performance support tool, on: 1) how to access all
key products on the Aviation Weather Website, and 2) a review of each products’ purpose and
limitations. (King, Blickensderfer, & Chaparro, 2019 (ref this HFES paper)). In turn, this
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performance support led to an increase in the percentage of key products accessed by participants
in the PWDST condition. Previous research indicates that gathering a variety of weather products
can assist with building a more well-rounded mental model of present and developing weather
(Vincent et al., 2013). Therefore, it is not surprising that pilots who used the PWDST and
accessed more key weather products, also reported weather phenomena more accurately then
participants in the control condition.
Hypothesis four proposed that more participants who used the PWDST (experimental
group) would decide NOT to embark on the VFR flight plan, compared to participants who did
not use the PWDST (control group). This hypothesis was developed based on previous research
that suggests that when making decisions, operators depend on their long term memory, short
term memory and stimuli to influence their choices and actions (Wickens, Gordon, Liu, & Lee,
1998). During the perceive stage of the weather preflight process, pilots gather weather
information and must fully process that information in order to gain a robust mental model of
developing weather and, in turn, assist with decision-making (Parson et al., 2005). Decisions
using weather mental models include route changes and, ultimately, the final decision of whether
to embark on the flight plan or not.
For the experimental task, participants were required to perform their preflight planning
for a proposed VFR flight plan and ultimately decide, based on the information they gathered,
whether they should embark on the VFR flight plan or not (Go or No Go decision). (Note that
the participants in this study were all non-instrument rated VFR Private Pilots, which means that
regulations (FAA, 2020), prohibit them from flying into IMC.) Hence, hypothesis four
predicted that pilots using the PWDST (experimental group) would have a more clear
understanding of the forecasted weather, and decide NOT to embark on the VFR flight as
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compared to participants who did not use the PWDST (control group). This hypothesis was not
supported. Results indicated that there was not a significant difference between experimental
conditions and their decision to Go or Not Go. These results may seem odd, considering that the
participants who used the PWDST: 1) accessed more key weather products and 2) seemed to
have a better understanding of present and developing weather. Multiple factors exist, however,
that could have contributed to the lack of significance in the go-no go decision.
The factors include that, first, participants may have decided to fly the proposed VFR
flight plan with plans to divert to an alternate airport, if the weather deteriorated. Second,
participants may have felt social pressure to continue with the flight since they were getting paid
to complete the entire research study. Lastly, participants may have felt the flight would be less
of a risk since it is a simulated flight scenario.
Exploratory Results
Retest of Hypothesis Four. Exploratory analyses, revealed that numerous participants in
the experimental group who made the decision to fly the VFR flight (i.e., decision to Go) also
stated “planning an alternate airport” as a reason as to why they decided to fly the proposed
VFR flight plan. This inspection of the raw data, led to subsequent analyses which revealed that,
despite a lack of significant difference between condition groups on the Go/No-Go decision.
there was a significant difference between groups when responding whether the VFR flight plan
was safe to fly as originally planned. More participants in the PWDST condition disagreed with
the statement that it was safe to fly the proposed VFR flight plan and land at the destination
airport, than participants in the control group. Additionally, when comparing responses between
conditions on how much they agree with whether this flight is risky due to weather, there was a
significant difference between group responses. More participants in the PWDST condition
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agreed that the flight was risky due to weather compared to participants in the control group.
These findings support previous research that indicates there are many factors at play when
deciding to embark on a flight plan and include biases, social pressure, as well as flexibility of
changing a flight plan, can be crucial components in preflight decision-making (NTSB, 2005).
Preflight Performance Variables Ability to Predict Preflight Decision Making
Hypothesized Results
Hypothesis Seven proposed that, aside from the PWDST itself, the preflight performance
variables (i.e., Percent of Key Products Accessed, Preflight Weather Phenomena, Preflight
Weather Trending, and Preflight Risk) would predict whether participants decided to embark on
the proposed VFR flight plan or not (see Figure 15).

Figure 15. Preflight Performance Variables Predict Go No Go Decision (Hypothesis 7)
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This hypothesis was developed based on previous research that suggests deciding
whether to embark on a flight plan depends on multiple factors, and previous research indicates
that information acquisition and analysis are key components in decision-making (Patel &
Groen, 1991: Wiggins & O'Hare, 1995). Additionally, while decision-making biases may be a
contributing factor for VFR into IMC incidents, other decision errors may be a result of poor
preflight planning, limited aviation weather knowledge and skills, and in general, a lack of
understanding of the existing and forecasted weather and it’s implication for flight
(Blickensderfer et. al, 2017; FAA, 2010; Fultz & Ashley, 2006). Therefore, it was hypothesized
that preflight performance variables, such as Percent of Key Products Accessed, Preflight
Weather Phenomena, Preflight Weather Trending, and Preflight Risk would predict whether
participants decided to embark on the proposed VFR flight plan or not. This hypothesis was
partially supported. Although the logistic regression model was statistically significant, results
indicated only Preflight Risk uniquely contributed to the model. These results are unexpected,
considering the literature supports that information gathered in the preflight process should guide
preflight decision-making (NTSB, 2005). These results do not align with previous research that
suggests that operators’ information selection could depict expertise and can be informative
when assessing pilots’ decision-making in the preflight phase, where weather information is
acquired and route and inflight decisions are determined (Wiggins, 2014). Further investigation
into the data revealed these results could be due to the various limitations associated with this
analysis, such as, limitations of the measures, a lack of linearity between the independent
variables and the dependent variable and the two outliers left in the analysis.

PWDST Effect on Inflight Performance
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Hypothesized Results
Hypotheses Five and Six proposed that using the PWDST during preflight would have a
positive effect on inflight performance including: Inflight Weather Phenomena (H5), Inflight
Weather trending (H5B), and Total Time in IMC (H6) (see Figure 16).

Figure 16. Effect of PWDST on Inflight Performance Hypotheses

Again, these hypotheses were based on several areas of the literature. First, previous research
which indicates that pilots rely on long term memory, feature cue association, and personal skills
/ abilities in order to assess situational awareness and risk perception while inflight (Wiggins,
2014; Hunter, 2002). At the same time, previous research suggests that intermediate skill level
operators have not fully established efficient expert level qualitative information processing
which is necessary to process task related information and implement action effectively (Bell,
1997). Thus, if pilots lack knowledge of aviation weather principles, it could hinder their ability
to use cue utilization (external environmental cues and gathered information) and long term
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memory to assess their situation (Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003). Which in turn, can determine the
quality of weather phenomena assessment and decision-making while inflight. One strategy to
help operators perform in these situations is to use a performance support tool. Prior research on
performance support tools has provided evidence that such tools do improve performance in a
variety of fields (Barness, Tunnessen, Worely, Simmons, & Ringe,1974; Miller, Chanllinor,
Masarie, & Myers, 1986). Hence, it was hypothesized that using a performance support tool
would improve pilots understanding of weather inflight. However, results indicated, the effect of
PWDST on inflight performance was not significant. These findings are not aligned with the
literature, which led to further investigation of these results.
Exploratory Results
Additional tests of Hypothesis Five and Six. Exploratory analyses investigated the effect of
PWDST on each dependent variable separately and with all outliers removed. Results indicated,
the PWDST did not have a significant effect on Inflight Weather Phenomena (H5) and Inflight
Weather trending (H5B). However, the PWDST did have a significant effect on Total time in
IMC (H6). The lack of effect of PWDST on Inflight Weather phenomena and Inflight Weather
trending, could be due to the lack of construct validity and/or sensitivity of the measures. These
measures were developed for this dissertation and had not been used in prior research. In contrast
to the Inflight survey measures, the total time pilots fly into IMC has been used successfully in
previous studies as a measure for inflight performance (Johnson & Wiegmann, 2015).
The current results about IMC are similar to findings in previous research that investigated
interventions to aid pilots in avoiding inflight weather hazards. For example, Alhstrom (et al?)
(2016) found that participants who had access to portable weather technology maintained a
greater horizontal distance from degraded weather conditions (i.e., away from IMC) than
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participants in the control group. Other research indicated that pilots who received training on
weather cue interpretation tended to deviate earlier when encountering hazardous weather
conditions (Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003). In the current study, participants who used the PWDST
received guidance on each weather product and guidance on risk that provided some level of
warning about the effect of present weather conditions on flight. As a result, pilots that used the
PWDST not only accessed a greater percentage key weather products, and had a better
understanding of current weather conditions before flight, they also spent less time in IMC
conditions.
Inflight Performance Variables Ability to Predict Total Time in IMC
Hypothesized Results
Hypothesis Eight proposed that, PWDST aside, participant scores on Inflight Weather
Phenomena, Inflight Weather Trend, and Inflight Weather Change would successfully predict
pilots’ total flight time in IMC (see Figure 17)
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Figure 17. Inflight Performance Variables Predict Total Time in IMC (Hypothesis 8)

Again, this was hypothesized based on previous research that suggests that situational
assessment and feature cue association are essential for avoiding degraded weather conditions
inflight (Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003). Thus, pilots who have more accurate understanding of the
inflight weather conditions were expected to have shorter times (if any) in IMC. Pilots may
encounter IMC as a result of an inadequate situation assessment of current and developing
weather and the potential effects on flight. Although, results indicated the model was statistically
significant, only Inflight Weather Phenomena was a statistically significant contributor to the
model. Inflight Weather Trend and Inflight Weather Change did not significantly contribute to
the prediction of Total Time In IMC. Therefore, Hypothesis 8 is partially supported. These
findings contradict theories in the literature claiming that weather inflight assessment and cue
utilization are essential for IMC avoidance.
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Several explanations exist as to why scores on weather trending and weather changes did
not predict time in IMC. First, the measures had not been used in prior research and, thus, the
construct validity may have been suspect. Additionally, the new measures may not have been
fully sensitive to detect differing levels of understanding. Finally, several statistical
assumptions were violated for this analysis, including Homoscedasticity, Independence of
Residuals, and Normality of the data. These violations could have impacted the reliability and
validity of our results.
Preflight and Inflight Performance Variables Relationships
Hypothesized Results
Hypothesis Nine proposed that Preflight risk mediates the relationship between the
PWDST and Total Time in IMC (see Figure 18). This was hypothesized due to previous research
that suggests inadequate preflight planning, poor decision-making, poor situational awareness,
and inadequate risk assessment as key contributors to unintentional VFR into IMC (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2005). Prior research findings highlight how much preflight
planning provides a foundation for inflight performance and situational awareness. Based on the
argument for (but few empirical findings of), the impact of preflight weather planning on inflight
performance, the current study investigated the relationship between preflight and inflight
variables.
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Figure 18. Preflight and Inflight Mediation Model (Hypothesis 9)

Results indicated that no correlations between inflight and preflight variables existed.
These results were not consistent with arguments on the importance of weather preflight in the
general aviation guidance literature (FAA, 2008; FAA, 2019). Further investigation into the
relationship between Preflight Risk, Total Time in IMC, and the PWDST indicated, there was a
significant direct relationship and a significant total effect of PWDST and on Total Time in IMC.
However, the indirect effect of PWDST on Preflight Risk and Preflight Risk on Total Time in
IMC was not significant. Therefore, Hypothesis nine was not supported. Although these findings
do not reflect arguments in the literature, the results are not surprising, considering the lack of
correlation between Preflight and Inflight variables.
Key Findings
To summarize, the purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of a performance support
tool (PWDST) for weather preflight on pilots’ preflight performance and inflight performance.
Results indicated that participants in the PWDST condition displayed better Preflight
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performance than the control condition, specifically, a higher rate of Information acquisition
(Percent of Key Products Accessed) and higher reported Weather awareness (Preflight Weather
Phenomena). While there was no significant effect of the PWDST on the Go or No Go decision,
further investigation did reveal PWDST had a significant effect on participants Preflight
decision-making. More participants in the PWDST condition decided the flight was not safe to
fly as planned without any flight plan changes and also reported the flight was risky due to
weather. Additionally, Preflight performance variables did predict Preflight decision-making (Go
or No Go decision), with Risk perception (Preflight Risk) uniquely contributing to the logistical
model. Furthermore, when investigating the PWDST effect on Inflight performance, results
revealed participants in the PWDST condition spent less time in IMC (Total Time in IMC) than
participants in the control condition. However, there were no differences between conditions in
Inflight Weather Awareness (Inflight Weather Phenomena and Inflight Weather Trending). At
the same time, results did reveal the Inflight Weather Awareness (Inflight Weather Phenomena,
Inflight Weather Trending, Weather Change) was able to successfully predict Inflight Decision
Making (Total Time in IMC), with Inflight Weather Phenomena significantly contributing to the
model. Lastly, although supported in the literature, study results revealed very little support for
the relationship between preflight and inflight performance.
Limitations
There are several factors that may limit the findings and generalizability of this study.
The sample for this study was limited and may not be representative of the overall General
aviation community. Although participants were being compensated to complete the study and
were instructed to treat this scenario as a they would a real flight, it is possible participants may
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have taken more risks due to the scenario being simulated. The study was also approximately
five hours long, and fatigue could have impacted participant’s performance.
External Validity. Every effort was taken to try to increase and maintain the external validity of
this study. The experimental task including simulated preflight weather planning and simulated
inflight scenario. For both scenarios pilots were provided with the same materials they would
have access to in real life, and when this was unavailable our team created very similar mock
materials. These materials were developed by a multidisciplinary team of meteorologists, human
factors specialists, and pilots of varying levels of experience. Weather data used for the Inflight
scenarios was based on actual historic weather data, very few features were edited for simulation
fidelity. Some limitations include the fidelity of the graphical depiction of weather in the
Prepare3D software and it’s limitations on user depth perception. As well as, the altering of
historical weather data in order to provide a more gradual VFR into IMC transition. There were
also times where there were some technical difficulty with the PWDST and participants had to
re-enter their information into the app.
Construct Validity. Although all the measures were developed with a multidisciplinary team, it
is very difficult to measure accuracy on weather phenomena, trending, and weather risk
perception. This has been cited as an issue in previous research and there are limited validated
measures available for these constructs (Weiss & Shanteau, 2003). During data processing each
survey measures was assessed for reliability and as a result certain questions were removed to
ensure reliability and this could have affected the overall construct validity of these measures.
Statistical Validity. There are some issues regarding the statistical validity of this study. This
study is slightly underpowered, with the optimum sample size being around 85 participants.
Additionally, assumptions were violated for certain analyses, which could effect the validity of
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these results. However, retesting with more appropriate analyses and tests were used in
exploratory analyses to further investigate these findings. Assumption for the majority of the
exploratory analyses were satisfied.
Theoretical and Practical Implications
The findings in this study provide implications for the GA Weather community and our
approach towards novice pilots’ lack of knowledge and skills, by investigating the effect of
automated guided assistance throughout the preflight process (e.g. a performance support tool,
PWDST) on preflight and inflight performance. Previous research indicates Private pilots
account for the majority of GA weather-related accidents and VFR into IMC (Fultz & Ashley,
2016). Previously cited contributing factors include weather knowledge and preflight planning
(NTSB, 2005; Blickensderfer eta al., 2017.; Burian & Jordan, 2002). The PWDST focuses on
improving preflight planning, in efforts to improve novice private pilots’ mental models of
developing weather and weather-related flight risks by assisting with weather information
acquisition, analysis, and application; while providing risk assessment guidance. Previous
research suggests that limitations associated with weather information acquisition include the
accessibility of weather products, insufficient understanding of weather product limitations, and
the low level of product interpretability (Blickensderfer eta al., 2015; Lanicci et al., 2012). In the
present study comparisons were made between groups provided with assistance in weather
product accessibility, product limitation, and product interpretation. Unfortunately, there is no
way of delineating exactly which aspect of the PWDST improved Information acquisition,
preflight weather awareness, preflight and inflight decision-making. However, these results
support previous research that suggests that sequential preflight stages, perceive, process, and
perform, are building blocks for weather mental model development, preflight, and inflight
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perceptions and decision-making (Lanicci et al., 2012; Parson et al., 2005;). It begs the question,
how much weather training and weather knowledge is needed for novice pilots to understand
weather information and make informed decisions, or whether the scientific communities’
approach to this issue has been wrong? Previous studies have tended to focus on developing
more dynamic and graphical weather displays in and out of the cockpit, as well as operator
training. Previous research on the implementation of more graphical and dynamic weather
displays tend to result in limited improvement in weather avoidance, instead, some of these tools
were used to fly closer to hazardous weather (Burgess & Thomas, 2004). While other
interventions, such as, weather training and portable weather devices resulted in increased
weather situational awareness, although pilots still flew too close to degraded weather conditions
(Wu, Gooding, Shelley, Duong, and Johnson, 2012; Ahlstrom et al., 2016). Few approaches have
attempted to include interpretation guidance, risk guidance, as well as guidance on weather
phenomena implications for flight. Perhaps, our approach should focus on increased product
usability, accessibility, and guidance on information application, as well as risk. Although
participants in the PWDST condition and Control condition only slightly varied in aviation
weather knowledge, their differences in preflight performance and inflight decisions were
significant. If this were a real life scenario, differences in performance between the PWDST
condition and the control condition may have been a matter of life or death.
This study also offers implications for research methodology in GA Aviation weather
research. Previous studies investigating the effects of interventions on inflight weather avoidance
rarely include a high fidelity simulation of the preflight planning process. This is imperative in
order to truly understand how introduced interventions impact inflight decision-making. As
previously stated, the preflight planning process is where the mental model and initial
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perspective of the flight plan are formed. Continuing to conduct studies simply investigating
inflight performance as an isolated event is unrealistic and can hinder the generalizability of the
study findings. Results from this study, support the importance of including high fidelity
preflight scenarios along with inflight scenarios to truly capture participant behaviors and
performance that may have significant impacts on inflight performance.
Future Research
Future research should continue to investigate the relationship between Preflight and
Inflight performance. As previously noted, the literature suggests a causal relationship between
Preflight and Inflight performance. However due to the lack of reliable measures for preflight
weather planning, there has been difficulty supporting this relationship (Blickensderfer et al.,
2017; Hunter, 2002; O’Hare, 1990; Weiss & Shanteau, 2003). There are very few validated risk
perception, aviation weather awareness, and decision-making measures available for research to
adapt and use for their specific simulated scenario. Advancements in validated measure
development is a critical component to understanding the GA weather problem.
Further investigation should be invested in improving the quality of tools available to
researchers to simulate preflight planning materials as well as, simulated depictions of weather
and weather generation. A high fidelity simulated environment is required for an effective
evaluation preflight performance and behaviors. Perhaps, the underlying reason why there are
very minimal high fidelity studies that include the preflight process is due to the limited tools
available to facilitate the production of needed materials (e.g. simulation of weather sources and
flight planning devices). Currently, in order for researchers to develop preflight weather planning
tools it requires a large team of diverse experiences, not many labs have the capability and
funding to produce high fidelity environments and materials. In order to see an improvement in
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the quality and generalizability of GA weather-related research, it is necessary to provide
scientists with easily accessible platforms and tools.
Although participants who used the performance support tool did have higher
information acquisition, preflight weather awareness, and inflight decision-making, currently in
this study, there is no way to determine which aspects of the intervention impacted these results.
Further investigation should be invested into separately assessing the effects of guidance on
weather information acquisition, weather interpretation, and risk guidance on preflight and
inflight performance.
Conclusion
For decades GA has accounted for the majority of weather-related accidents. Although we
have seen a slight decrease in the amount of GA weather-related accidents, the fatality rates
remains relatively unchanged. Low hour Inexperienced Private pilots have incurred the majority
of GA weather-related accidents, including VFR into IMC, which are the most lethal type of
weather-related incident. Previous research cites poor preflight planning practices and a lack of
aviation weather knowledge as key contributing factors to the high novice private pilot accident
and fatality rate. Although multiple advances have been made in the presentation of weather
products, few of these advanced have led to improved preflight and inflight performance. It may
be beneficial to consider new methods towards improving low experienced pilots’ aviation
weather practices. Perhaps by providing pilots with a performance support tool to aid them in the
preflight process, pilots’ understanding of weather, decisions, and inflight weather-related
behavior may improve. Thus, decision support tool technology could assist novice/intermediate
pilots through the aviation weather preflight process. The purpose of this study was to investigate
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the effect of a performance support tool for weather preflight (PWDST) on pilots’ preflight
performance and inflight performance.
Results from this study did provide more insight on preflight and inflight behaviors and
performance. Study findings revealed the predictive relationship between risk perception during
preflight planning and making go or no go decisions. Where, participants who displayed more
accurate preflight risk perception, also were more likely to decide not to fly. As well as, the
predictive relationship between Inflight Weather awareness and decision-making. Where,
participants who were more aware of inflight weather developments, were also more likely to
spend less time flying in degraded weather conditions. Study findings also revealed the affect a
preflight weather support tool can have on preflight and inflight performance. Results revealed
that PWDST assisted low hour inexperienced private pilots with weather information acquisition
and weather awareness during the preflight stage. Additionally, PWDST also assisted low hour
inexperienced private pilots with deciding how save a flight plan is and whether there are any
weather-related risks associated with a flight plan. The PWDST also assisted Low Hour
Inexperienced pilots with weather avoidance. Findings from this study suggest that preflight
weather performance support tools may be able to assist low hour inexperienced with preflight
planning practices and inflight and preflight decision-making. Furthermore, perhaps by creating
weather and flight planning technology that also helps with weather accessibility, weather
interpretation, and risk assessment we could improve preflight practices as well as preflight and
inflight decision-making. As the scientific community continues to understand the various factor
involved in novice pilot preflight and inflight performance, it is crucial to continue to consider
operator knowledge, skills, and needs. As a community, we should strive to develop assistive
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technology to help fit and fill user gaps in skills and knowledge and not attempt to try to redefine
our users’ roles to fit our design limitations.
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Preflight Weather Decision Support Tool (PWDST): User-Centered Design
Process and Usability Validation
Jayde King, M.S., John Kleber, B.S., Ashlee Harris, B.S., Barbara Chaparro, Ph.D., Beth Blickensderfer, Ph.D.
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, FL
General Aviation flight operations have been negatively affected by the slow decreasing weather related accident
rate for the last 20 years. Upon further investigation, research suggests, that poor preflight planning and a lack of
aviation weather experience and knowledge may be contributing factors to the stagnant weather related accident
rate. Our team developed a Preflight Weather Decision Support Tool (PWDST) to help novice pilots access,
interpret, and apply weather information. We used a user-centered design process which involved an initial task
analysis, low-fidelity prototyping, low-fidelity usability testing, user interviews and expert review. This study
assessed and compared the perceived usability, difficulty, and the system assistance satisfaction of the PWDST.
Participants (n=9) completed a usability study and a series of surveys during, as well as, after the completion of the
preflight planning scenario. A series of Mann-Whitney U Tests were conducted to compare the difference between
Private Pilot and Certified Flight Instructors (CFI) perceived usability, difficulty, and system assistance satisfaction
ratings. Results indicated, there were no significant differences between group ratings. Overall, both groups reported
above average usability, system assistance and low difficulty rating for the PWDST. Future research and possible
implications are discussed.

this need, our team developed an aviation
weather decision support tool. The tool is
designed to assist low hour inexperienced
private pilots with the aviation weather
preflight planning process. The purpose of
this study is to assess the usability of the
Preflight Weather Decision Support Tool
(PWDST).

INTRODUCTION
The General Aviation (GA) weather
related accident rate has remained the
slowest decreasing accident rate within GA
flight operations (FAA, 2010; Fultz &
Ashley, 2016; AOPA, 2008). Previous
research indicates the majority of these
accidents result in fatalities, with Visual
Flight Rule flight operations into Instrument
Meteorological Conditions (VFR into IMC)
being the most hazardous type of weather
related accident (FAA, 2010; Fultz &
Ashley, 2016; Goh & Wiegmann, 2001;
AOPA, 2008). Primarily, low hour
inexperienced private pilots incur the
majority of weather related accidents
(Capobianco & Lee, 2001; Fultz & Ashley,
2016). Multiple sources have identified poor
preflight planning and a lack of aviation
weather knowledge and skills as a possible
contributing factors for inadequate inflight
weather avoidance and VFR into IMC
incidents (Blickensderfer et.al,). To address

Background
Preflight Planning. Weather planning is
a crucial component of the preflight
planning process. During weather preflight
planning pilots access multiple weather
sources, interpret weather products, and
develop a flight plan. This process is
intended to better equip pilots with a mental
model of current and developing weather
conditions along their flight route. The FAA
divides the preflight process into three major
components, perceive, process, and perform
(Parson et al., 2005).
The weather preflight planning process
begins with the “perceiving” phase, where
pilots collect an array of weather
198
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products. During weather information
acquisition pilots are able to search and
navigate various weather sources of
differing modalities to form a holistic mental
model of prevailing and forecasted weather
conditions, including: potable weather
applications, websites, and call in services
(e.g. Aviation Weather Center (AWC), 1800 Weather Brief Call-in, and Foreflight).
However, a pilot’s ability to navigate these
weather sources depends on the pilots’
familiarity with the source, the usability of
the source interface, and the quality of the
provided weather information. Therefore,
limitations within the information
acquisition stage may hinder the quantity
and quality of information pilots receive,
which may in turn result in an inadequate
and inaccurate pool of weather information
(Parson et al., 2005).
After gathering all the weather
information, pilots progress to the
“processing” phase of the task (Parson et al.,
2005). Weather product interpretation can be
quite challenging, especially for
inexperienced pilots who lack foundational
understanding of basic weather principles
(Blickensderfer et.al, 2018). The majority of
weather information is encoded and may
require the user to access legends and/or
have previous experience with the product to
facilitate product interpretation (e.g.
METARS, TAFFs, Wind Aloft, Station
Plots). Failure to accurately interpret
weather information could lead to a dismal
distortion of the received weather
information. Furthermore, defective
reception of weather information can
influence the pilot’s mental model of
prevalent weather conditions and may result
in hazardous weather behavior
(Blickensderfer et.al, 2018).
“Perform” is the final stage of the weather
prefight planning process (Parson et al.,
2005). Subsequent to the interpretation of

the received weather information, pilots
must apply the extrapolated weather
information to their current aeronautical
flight plan. Considering this phase requires
pilots to have correct completion of both the
Perceiving, and processing phase, the
perform stage may be the most challenging
component of the entire task. Pilots need to
understand the prevailing weather
conditions, as well as, the flight safety risks
each weather phenomena may pose for their
specific flight plan. Therefore, this task will
demand the user to function at a higher level
of cognitive processing and may require
previous experience.
Since the weather preflight planning
phase is a layered task, deficient
performance on any weather planning phase
could invalidate all the previous and future
task phases. This may result in uninformed
preflight and inflight decision making.
Previous research highlighted poor product
usability, inadequate weather knowledge
and skills, risk assessment, and decision
making as contributing factors for VFR into
IMC incidents (NTSB, 2005; Capobianco &
Lee, 2001). The effects of these contributing
factors may begin in the preflight process
and continue to develop throughout the
inflight process, resulting in poor weather
avoidance and hazardous inflight decision
making.
Decision Support Tools. A solution to
the GA weather problem has been attempted
from various perspectives and fields. This
includes the development of increasingly
adaptive and dynamic weather displays.
Although the development of new weather
technology for preflight and in the cockpit
interfaces may improve certain aspects of
situational awareness, the majority of these
technological advances have failed to
prevent hazardous weather encounters
inflight (Latorella & Chamberlain, 2002;
Yuchnovicz et al., 2001; Beringer and Ball,
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2004). It may be that aviation weather and
flight planning tasks are too complicated and
cognitively taxing to simply be addressed by
the introduction of new technologies.
Instead, new approaches that compensate for
the users’ lack of meteorological knowledge
and skills is necessary to fill the gap
between the user and the weather planning
task. King, Ortiz, Blickensderfer, and
Christy (2018) explored the possibility of
applying Decision support tool technology
to the aviation weather preflight planning
task. Additionally, Ortiz, Blickensderfer,
and Christy (2018) suggest decision support
tool technology could address the disparity
of skill and knowledge between the user and
task, as well as, improve overall preflight
and inflight performance. Furthermore, with
certain precautions, a preflight decision
support tool may offer just enough
assistance to help novice private pilots
operate at a higher level of performance and
safety. In order to promote improved
performance, King, Ortiz, Blickensderfer,
and Christy (2018) suggest the preflight
decision support tool should apply specific
levels of automation to specific tasks,
consider and avoid the negative impacts of
automation, provide training for the preflight
weather decision support tool, include a
multidisciplinary team for product
development, consider usability, and
integrate system adaptability.
Preflight Weather Decision Support Tool
Description & Development. In this study,
our team developed a prototype preflight
weather decision support tool (PWDST).
The tool was developed by a
multidisciplinary team including, two
human factors specialists, a meteorologist, a
private pilot, and a gold standard flight
instructor. The purpose of the tool is to
assist novice low hour private pilots with the

weather portion of the preflight planning
process. The PWDST assists pilots
with accessing, interpreting, and applying
weather information in context of their
current flight plan. The PWDST uses a
mixture of usability, low level
information/analysis automation, and
expertise knowledge to guide pilots through
establishing their personal minimums,
determining weather checking airports,
accessing, interpreting, and applying
weather information, and assessing weather
risks. Each team member was included in
the application development and beta
testing.
Figure 1. PWDST: Low Level Significant
Weather Chart Section Flow

Figure 1. PWDST: Low Level Significant
Weather Chart Section. First, Participants
view the homepage (a), then participants are
introduced to the order for the preflight
planning scenario. Next, participants are
shown how to access each product on the
Aviation Center Website (c through e), then
participants are guided through product
interpretation and asked prompting
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questions to encourage the application of the
interpreted weather information to their
flight.
PWDST Development
The PWDST underwent four major
phases of review and modifications. The
first step in the PWDST development
process included a thorough Preflight
Planning Task analysis. This task analysis
identified the major and minor possible
limitations associated with completing
weather preflight planning using AWC and
traditional preflight planning tools. Next, we
interviewed a series of private pilots and
instructors to gain a better understanding of
common hindrances to novice pilots while
preflight weather planning. Through the use
of target market feedback and Subject
Matter expert guidance, we developed the
first PWDT prototype. Next, the PWDST
underwent an iterative process including a
series of expert reviews and modifications.
Data and feedback from expert reviewers
and subject matter experts were incorporated
into the future designs in order to improve
the usability, as well as, content and face
validity of the tool. Now, that we have
completed the development process of our
final prototype, it is imperative to observe
and assess the usability of the interface and
gauge users’ impressions of the system.
METHOD
Experimental Design
The study was a mixed group design.
The purpose of the study was to assess the
usability of the PWDST tool, with
consideration for experience. There were
two levels of experience, the novice level
included Private Pilots, while the expert
level included Certified Flight Instructors
(CFI). Both groups completed the same
preflight scenarios using the PWDST tool.

Participants
Nine pilots (Mage= 24.11 (SD= 5.11))
from a Southeastern United States university
were recruited to participate in this study.
Four participants held a private pilot license
(Mdnfigtht hours = 102.10 (SD= 55.00)) and five
pilots were CFI rated (Mdnfigtht hours = 710.00
(SD= 575.20). The majority of the
participants completed their flight training at
a Part 141 facility. The study was reviewed
and approved in advance by the EmbryRiddle Aeronautical University Institutional
Review Board for the protection of our
participants. For incentive, each participant
received $25 dollars for the completion of
this study.
Materials
The following materials were used in
this study: PWDST, PWDST Training
Video, and the Simulated Preflight Task :
Preflight Weather Decision Support
Tool. The Preflight Decision Support Tool
was wire-framed using Google Drive App
Draw.io and the high fidelity mockup was
created with AXURE software student
license. The purpose of this tool is to guide
users through the preflight process and
improve preflight and inflight performance.
The Preflight Weather Decision Support
Tool (PWDST) is comprised of three main
components, the preflight guide, the
personal minimums sections, and the risk
assessment and checklist output.
PWDST Training Video. This six-minute
video was developed using Microsoft Video
Maker. The purpose of the training video is
to guide users through the main components
of the PWDST. The video illustrates how to
navigate the tool’ preflight guide, the
personal minimums sections, and the risk
assessment and checklist output.
Experimental Task: The task for this
study required participants to perform a
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preflight an aviation weather scenario. The
flight scenario is a VFR Into IMC scenario.
In the scenario, the scheduled flight route
starts at the departure airport, KAEL, and
ends at the destination airport, KDTL.
During the preflight scenario, participants
were asked to use the PWDST to access and
interpret weather for their flight route. The
following weather products were used in this
scenario:
• Big Picture Products: Low Level
Significant Weather Chart, Surface
Analysis, Satellite, Radar
• Hazard Products: Convective
SIGMETs and G- AIRMETs
• Visibility Products: METARs
Surveys Measures. All surveys were
developed online using Qualtrics survey
software. The participants completed all the
surveys at the data collection site at their
own pace. This study included the following
surveys: 1) Demographic questionnaire, 2)
After Scenario Questionnaire, 3) Subjective
Mental Effort Questionnaire, 4) System
Usability Scale, 5) and a Participant Rater
Form.
1) Demographic Questionnaire: The
demographic survey is composed of 84
items. The demographic survey items cover
topics such as participant age, flight training,
flight experience, weather training, and
weather experience.
2) After Scenario Questionnaire: The
After Scenario Questionnaire is a user
satisfaction survey (Lewis, 1991). This scale
has three items that prompt participants to
rate on a scale from 1-7 their overall
satisfaction with the system. In this study,
this scale was used to assess participants’
satisfaction with systems support and design
for various assigned tasks and activities.
3) Subject Mental Effort Questionnaire:
This scale is a one item sale that measures
participants’ perceived difficulty of tasks

(Sauro & Dumas, 2009). The Scale ranges
from (0) Not at all hard to do, (110)
Tremendously hard to do, and (150). In this
study, this questionnaire was used to assess
participants perceived mental effort while
completing various assigned tasks.
4) System Usability Scale: This survey
questions users on their perceived usability
for a particular system (Brooke, 1996). The
survey has 10 items; users are prompted to
rate how much they agree with each item on
a scale from one (Strongly Disagree) to five
(Strongly Agree). This scale was used to
survey participants’ overall impressions
about the system.
5) Participant Rater Form: These
questions prompt the participant about their
system assistance satisfaction and difficulty
for completing each task. For the difficulty
rating for completing each task using the
PWDST, the options range from 1 (Very
Difficult) to 7 (Very Easy). While for the
system assistance satisfaction scale,
participants are asked to rate their
satisfaction with the support information
provided by the PWDST for each task, with
options ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree).
Procedure
After an initial briefing, participants
were asked to sign a consent form. Then
participants used a computer to complete the
online demographic questionnaire. Next,
participants were briefed and trained on the
Preflight Weather Decision Support Tool
and completed the post-training quiz.
Participants then completed a series of
activities using the Preflight Weather
Decision Support Tool system on an iPad.
For the activity, participants were asked to
complete weather preflight planning using
the app and access, interpret, and apply
weather products from the Aviation Weather
Center Website (AWC.org). After each
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activity participants answered questions
from Participant Rater Form. After all
activities

slightly higher than CFI reported system
satisfaction.
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Subjective Mental Effort Questionnaire
Overall perceived difficulty completing
tasks using the PWDST system was reported
on a scale from (0) Not at all hard to do,
(110) Tremendously hard to do, and (150).
In this study both groups average rating was
lower than 25, A bit hard to do. Results
indicated, there were no significant
difference between groups for overall
system satisfaction (U = 9.00, z = –.256, p =
.80, r = -.09). However, Private pilots’
reported system satisfaction was slightly
higher than CFI reported system satisfaction.

were completed, participants completed the
System Usability Scale, Subjective Mental
Effort Questionnaire and the After- scenario
questionnaire for their overall experience
with the PWDT. Lastly, participants were
debriefed and compensated.
RESULTS
A series of Mann-Whitney U-Tests
were conducted in order to examine the
differences in between Private Pilot and
Certified Flight Instructors impressions,
satisfaction, and rated usability of the
PWDST application. Results indicated, there
were no significant differences between
Private Pilot and Certified Flight Instructor
impressions, satisfaction, and rated usability
of the app.
System Usability Scale (SUS)
For the overall system usability on a
scale from 0-100, both groups rated the
usability above 68, which is considered
above average. Although, Private pilots
reported a slightly higher system usability
score, there were no significant differences
between groups (U = 9.00, z = –.247, p =
.81, r = - .08).
After Scenario Questionnaire
Overall system satisfaction was
reported on a scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), both groups
average rated the overall system satisfaction
above 5. Results indicated, there were no
significant difference between groups for
overall system satisfaction (U = 7.00, z = –
.747, p = .46, r = -.25). However, Private
pilots’ reported system satisfaction was

Participant Rater form
For each product within the Big Picture,
Hazards, And Visibility product sections,
participants completed a difficulty scale
with options ranging from 1 (Very Difficult)
to 7 (Very Easy). Additionally, participants
also completed a satisfaction scale for each
product with options ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Six
Mann Whitney U Tests were ran to compare
means between Private Pilots and CFI,
results indicated, there were no significant
difference between groups for participant
rated difficulty and satisfaction with system
assistance for: Big Picture (rated difficulty:
U = 3.5, z = -1.63, p = .10, r = -.05) (rated
system assistance satisfaction: U = 4.00, z =
-1.50, p = .14, r = -.05), Hazards (rated
difficulty: U = 9.50, z = –.13, p = .90, r = .04) (rated system assistance satisfaction: U
= 7.00, z = –.81, p = .42, r = -.03), and
Visibility products (rated difficulty: U =
2.00, z = –.2.16,
p = .03, r = -.72) (rated system assistance
satisfaction: U = 5.50,z=-1.15,p=.25,r=-.38).
Table 1: Survey Measure Mean Scores for
Private Pilots and Certified Instructors.
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investigating the effects the PWDST may
have on preflight and inflight performance
for novice and experienced pilots.
DISCLAIMER
The views expressed in this paper are those
of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the organization with which they
are affiliated.
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